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European Union legislation on transmission capacity allocation and congestion management 
thrives to achieve fair and consistent treatment for European market participants. A lack of suf-
ficient and coordinated methods to handle internal congestions in capacity calculation and allo-
cation reduces given transmission capacity to the market. This leads to inefficient market and 
undue discrimination between market participants depending on location of internal conges-
tions. Challenge is noticed in Finnish congestion management when production is shifting to-
wards north whereas most of the consumption is located in south. Improved methods should 
consider socio-economic impacts and treat market participants without undue discrimination.  
 
This master thesis discusses transmission capacity calculation between internal and cross-zonal 
trade including rules to avoid undue discrimination. Developed method improves currently used 
congestion management practices by estimating market impacts of capacity reduction during in-
ternal congestions in European market area. Congestion management during capacity calcula-
tion is realised either with redispatching or cross-border transmission capacity reduction. A de-
cision between these methods is depending on which method shows lower socio-economic costs 
and higher market efficiency. 
 
Socio-economic impacts of reduced transmission capacity were estimated based on market in-
formation gathered from years 2016–2017. Results show that socio-economic impact for re-
duced cross-zonal transmission capacity is averagely within 15–45 €/MWh during congestion 
while the majority of values are within 20–30 €/MWh indicating lower values than average 
Finnish day-ahead market price. Most of market impacts occur in Finnish bidding zone, respec-
tively capacity changes influence Swedish and Baltic State bidding zones. 
 
Highly volatile redispatching costs were estimated subject to balancing market prices due to rel-
atively low quantity of historical redispatching measures. When comparing costs between ca-
pacity reduction and redispatching, results conclude socio-economic justification of redispatch-
ing especially below 100 MW congestions in all price ranges due to similar or even lower costs 
than capacity reduction. Above this, relieving congestions based on absolute costs of required 
actions and therefore, congestions within 100–200 MW are generally relieved with redispatch-
ing if reasonably priced resources are available. During even higher congestions, the availability 
of redispatch should be considered and capacity reduction is justified. 
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Euroopan unionin lainsäädäntö siirtokapasiteetin jakamisen ja ylikuormitusten hallintaan pyrkii 
varmistamaan markkinatoimijoiden tasapuolisen ja yhtenäisen kohtelun Euroopan sisäisessä 
sähkön siirrossa. Riittävän siirtokapasiteetin puute ja epäyhtenäiset siirtokapasiteetin jakamisen 
menetelmät ovat asettaneet eurooppalaiset markkinatoimijat eri asemaan riippuen alueellisista 
siirtorajoituksista. Haaste syntyy myös Suomen sisäisiin siirtoihin tuotannon siirtyessä pohjoi-
semmaksi kulutuksen ollessa etelässä. Kehitettävän menetelmän tulee huomioida tasapuolisesti 
eri markkinaosapuolet ja olla kansantaloudellisesti perusteltavissa. 
Diplomityö käsittelee siirtokapasiteetin laskentaa ja sitä, miten siirtokapasiteetti jaetaan tarjous-
alueiden sisäisille ja välisille siirroille, ja siten eri markkinatoimijoille huomioiden lainsäädän-
nön vaatimukset. Työssä kehitetään nykyistä syrjimättömyysperiaatteen varmistavaa menetel-
mää siten, että tarjousalueiden sisäisten rajoitusten tarjousalueiden rajoille siirtämisestä aiheutu-
vat markkinavaikutukset arvioidaan sähköpörssien kehittämän simulointiohjelmiston avulla. 
Käytännössä sisäiset rajoitukset tulisi hoitaa vastakauppaamalla rajakapasiteetin rajoittamisen 
sijaan, jos sen voidaan osoittaa olevan tehokkaampaa huomioiden markkinahyödyt ja vastakau-
pan kustannukset.  
Työssä tutkittiin rajasiirtokapasiteetin muutosten vaikutusta kansantaloudelliseen hyötyyn simu-
loimalla vuosien 2016–2017 markkinatilanteita. Arvioitujen tulosten perusteella rajakapasiteetin 
alentamisen kustannus pullonkaulatilanteessa on keskimäärin 20–50 €/MWh, ja pääosa tarkas-
telluista viikoista on 20–30 €/MWh välillä. Suomen keskimääräiseen day-ahead aluehintaan 
suhteutettuna tämä on hieman alhaisempi ja kuvaa melko alhaista siirtojen hallinnan kustannus-
ta verrattuna vastakauppaan. Rajakapasiteetin alentamisen vaikutukset ulottuivat Suomen hinta-
alueen ulkopuolelle etenkin Ruotsin ja Baltian maiden tarjousalueisiin. 
Vastakaupan kustannuksen suuruutta verrattiin säätösähköhintoihin vastakauppojen pienestä 
määrästä johtuen. Tulosten valossa vastakauppa on kansantaloudellisesti perusteltua alle 100 
MW:n sisäisissä rajoituksissa kaikilla hintatasoilla, sillä sen kustannus on sama tai alhaisempi 
kuin rajakapasiteetin alentamisella. Suuremmat rajoitukset perustuvat arvioidun rajasiirtokapasi-
teetin alentamisen kustannukseen vastakaupan voimakkaan kasvun johdosta. Tämän perusteella 
noin 100–200 MW:n vastakaupat ovat kansantaloudellisesti perusteltuja, mikäli niitä on saata-
villa kohtuullisesti hinnoiteltuna. Tätä suurempia vastakauppoja voi olla haastava toteuttaa, 
koska resursseja ei välttämättä ole saatavilla.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Change towards cleaner energy system creates major changes in electricity market and 
power system. The latest Capacity Calculation and Congestion Management (CACM) 
guideline tries to assure low-carbon objectives broader in the energy market and target 
rules are made to utilise European interconnected transmission networks more efficient-
ly in future low-carbon society. Intermittency related to renewable energy generation is 
apparent and the transmission network operation requires coordinated methods between 
TSOs. Increasing renewable energy adoption creates uncertainties related to power sys-
tem operation and may lead to congestion in the transmission network. 
Increasing internal congestion in future is due to significant transmission between North 
and South of Finland and resulting surplus and deficit area between North and South of 
Finland. Congestion is eventually noticeable in electricity prices and may discriminate 
if required methods are absent. Changes toward to renewable energy resources will pri-
mary change production location to Northern Finland and increasing risk for congestion 
in P1-cut transmission which is an internal transmission network intersection between 
South and North of Finland. 
Internal congestion issues have been acknowledged by Agency for the Cooperation En-
ergy Regulators (ACER) which states concerns due to a lack of common procedures to 
accommodate congestions in European transmission network. Generally, internal con-
gestion issues has been shifted towards cross-zonal borders by decreasing cross-zonal 
capacities in order to avoid additional congestion related costs for Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs). Existing capacity calculation and allocation procedures have created 
situation where cross-zonal transmission capacities are reduced without clear transpar-
ency and creating a challenge for efficient electricity market. It leads to different treat-
ment of market participants and may discriminate unjustly. Current practices are not 
providing incentives for TSOs to increase their cross-zonal capacities in order to avoid 
undue discrimination between internal and cross-zonal flows. (ACER 2016)  
Current European regulation of undue discrimination and transmission capacity calcula-
tion and allocation notices the issue and represent principles to avoid undue discrimina-
tion. These principles shall be taken into account in the development and implementa-
tion of short-term congestion management methods developed by TSOs. Main task is to 
create market based implementation without affecting excessively to electricity market 
providing transparent and cost-reflective price signals for market participants. For this 
reason, rules to avoid undue discrimination should be further developed, tested and im-
plemented in the current congestion management in Finnish transmission system. 
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1.1 Objective and structure of the thesis 
This master thesis focuses on transmission capacity calculation and allocation between 
market participants without undue discrimination between internal and cross-border 
trade. Rules to avoid undue discrimination should follow current CACM guidelines 
which thrives to guarantee electricity market operational security and efficiency. In ac-
cordance to the regulation, target is to increase efficiency in electricity market focusing 
on the European point of view. 
Thesis thrives to revise current method and rules avoiding undue discrimination applied 
by Fingrid in capacity calculation phase. This essentially means revising congestion 
management methods in order to ensure fair treatment for each market participants. 
Congestion management is revised for internal congestions within Finnish bidding zone 
by estimating market impacts of congested transmission situations with simulation tool. 
Market impacts are measured based on two different congestion management methods: 
relieving internal congestion by redispatching or reducing cross-zonal transmission ca-
pacity. Redispatching should be applied if market impacts of the capacity reduction is 
higher compared to redispatching costs indicating higher efficiency and lower market 
impacts. Analysed study results and estimated redispatching costs are foundation for re-
vised Fingrid´s capacity allocation and congestion management policy.  
The first two chapter represents background of the market environment and raises ca-
pacity allocation and congestion management objectives into attention. Power system 
and market represents common knowledge regarding supply and demand and European 
market coupling. Similarly, formation of day-ahead price and its impacts during conges-
tion are represented and giving foundation for theoretical background of consumer and 
producer socio-economic welfare calculation in European electricity market. Then, 
transmission capacity calculation is represented and how cross-zonal border transmis-
sion capacity is determined. Technical aspects and calculation methods are represented 
to increase awareness of physical concerns of congestions. 
Forth chapter represents undue discrimination rules based on European Commission 
(EC) regulation (No. 2009/714) and CACM guideline (2015/1222) in order to ensure 
accordance of current methods. Chapter gives detailed view on how congestion man-
agement should be realised and how ACER understands those requirements. Then, fifth 
chapter describes current congestion management methods applied by Fingrid in capaci-
ty calculation phase and describes reasons behind policies and made assumptions. 
Market impacts are analysed in sixth chapter based on simulated market outcomes from 
historical market data. European socio-economic welfare change is calculated for con-
sumers and producers representing market impact when congestion are relieved in P1-
cut transmission. Then, redispatching costs are estimated and compared to transmission 
capacity reduction costs. Revised procedures are verified in accordance of regulations. 
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2. POWER SYSTEM AND MARKET 
This chapter presents power system and electricity market showing common knowledge 
regarding to Nordic transmission system and European electricity market and gives 
foundation for understanding congestion management in internal and cross-border 
transmission. These subjects support understanding price formation in electricity market 
as represented along with producer and consumer surplus. Especially price formation 
and welfares for producers and consumers are essential to this thesis and giving back-
ground for further review to transmission capacity calculation and congestion manage-
ment.   
2.1 Nordic power system 
Power system is understood as a whole supply chain from generation to consumption 
where in between transmission system enables electricity to consumers. Reliable power 
system utilisation requires control and balance between generation and consumption. 
These tasks require profound cooperation with Nordic TSOs in a common synchronous 
system. 
Finnish transmission system is part of a synchronous area of the Nordic interconnected 
power system. It consists countries including Sweden, Norway and partially Denmark 
where Western Denmark is part of a synchronous area of Central Europe connecting to 
Nordic synchronous area with direct current transmission. The Nordic transmission sys-
tem is utilised with alternative current and direct current depending on situations includ-
ing as well Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania where these Baltic States are connected by 
HVDC (High Voltage Direct Current) with Finland and Sweden (Partanen et al. 2015) 
Nordic TSOs have responsibility for reliable power system in order to sustain security 
of supply of the transmission system and have legal responsibility to manage the trans-
mission system for the most beneficial manner from society´s standpoint. National 
TSOs has responsibility to maintain operation in nationwide with cooperation with other 
TSOs. TSOs actions are regulated by national and European Commission (EC) legisla-
tion enabling harmonised and fair electricity market rules. National and international au-
thorities for instance energy authority in Finland and ACER approve methodologies 
proposed by TSOs and give recommendation based on legislation and monitor imple-
mentation progress. Common guidelines are established as well with ENTSO-E (Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity) which is an association 
of European TSOs founded according to EC regulation (No. 2009/714).  
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Finnish electricity production has been relatively diverse compared to European coun-
tries meaning that Finland does not have dependency on a single production method. 
Half of the Finnish electricity production is generated by nuclear and hydropower and 
fossil fuel based production is approximately one fifth of the yearly production. Other 
rapidly increasing resource is wind power with under one tenth of all productions (Finn-
ish Energy 2017). Demand is normally supplied as well with imports from Sweden 
guaranteeing operational security and similarly harmonises electricity prices in Nordic 
area.  
2.2 European electricity market 
In a work of sustaining balance between supply and demand, electricity market is creat-
ed to meet these requirements. Electricity market offers a platform for producers and 
consumers to trade efficiently electricity and sustaining balance between supply and 
demand. Efficiently working electricity market supports transmission system operation 
and making participation to the market easier. Efficiency requires highly integrated 
electricity market to create appropriate outcome.  
Integration process has been continuous in the Nordic electricity market since 1991. It 
has improved efficiency and made possible to utilise various energy resources support-
ing renewable energy targets. Currently, the Nordic power system is a part of the Euro-
pean electricity market gathering large proportion market participants such as produc-
ers, consumers, TSOs and distribution system operators. Electricity market participants 
are for the most part producers and consumers. (Partanen et al. 2015)  
European electricity market is divided to bidding zones where market participants set 
offers to buy or sell electricity in the corresponding bidding zone. The bidding zone it-
self represents a single pricing area where price is identical within bidding zone without 
a price spread. Bidding zones in European-wide trade are connected adjacently with 
cross-zonal transmission networks where transmissions are depending on transmission 
capacities between bidding zones. (Biggar & Hesamzadeh 2014) 
Electricity market area is represented in figure 1 including bidding zones and hourly 
price for a one hour in Nordic and Baltic States. Most of the time electricity prices are 
similar in Finland, Sweden and Northern Norway bidding zones due to sufficient trans-
mission capacity between zones. Prices are separated if transmission is congested such 
as demand for electricity is higher in certain bidding zone and creates individual pricing 
area. (Fingrid 2018a)  
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Figure 1. Nordic and Baltic electricity market and bidding zones on 4th April 2018 
(Nord Pool 2018a) 
Congestions are depending on hydrological situation between years and seasons and 
creates negative market impacts when transmission is restricted. Low availability of hy-
dropower tends to increase electricity price due to large reliance of hydropower in the 
Nordic power system. Similarly, high hydrological reserve decreases the bidding zone 
price as significant amount of energy is produced by hydropower due to lower marginal 
costs compared to other production methods. High availability of hydropower in the 
Nordic electricity market guarantee similar prices in larger market area if transmission 
flow is adequate. However, power system could encounter congestions in Finland if 
large proportion of electricity is imported from Northern Sweden and Lapland and 
transferred to Southern Finland creating congested P1-cut transmission. These events 
are relevant especially during high demand in Southern Finland. Congested cross-zonal 
interconnections are discussed more profoundly in chapter 2.3.2. (Partanen et al. 2015)  
Imports from Sweden have major role for electricity supply in Finland. Imported elec-
tricity guarantees lower electricity prices in the transmission system and improves secu-
rity of supply due to larger market area. Larger market area is in a central role in devel-
oping European market coupling where two or more electricity markets are integrated in 
to one in order to implement cross-zonal transmission capacity allocation and utilisation 
of generation resources more efficiently. (Partanen et al. 2015) 
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2.2.1 Day-ahead and intraday market 
Day-ahead market is a daily market for buyers and sellers where electricity is traded a 
day before the delivery day by an implicit auction. A large proportion of electricity is 
traded in the day-ahead market representing a primary market for market participants to 
buy or sell electricity and further the intraday market is utilised if supply and demand 
does not meet. Market participants submits their bids to the market on different hours 
and bidding zones before clearing process. Clearing process guarantees that electricity 
price is formatted efficiently accordingly to the physical need of electricity.  
Day-ahead and intraday markets are administered by NEMOs which offer trading ser-
vices and power market for market participants. It is based competition and currently 
Nord Pool is active in Nordic, Baltic States, Germany and other eight European coun-
tries in day-ahead and intraday markets (ACER 2018). In the day-ahead market, TSOs 
have to define transmission capacity for each day and hour and provide cross-zonal 
transmission capacities to the market for allocation before the implicit auction period. 
Based on calculated cross-zonal transmission capacities and given offers to the day-
ahead market, NEMOs´ pricing algorithm allocate transmission capacity between mar-
ket participants. The day-ahead auction is being held a day before the delivery day after 
left offers before 12:00 pm CET. These contain bid or ask offers for every hour on fol-
lowing day. (Nord Pool 2018b)  
The intraday market is a continuous market which usually correct imbalances that are 
not able to forecast a day before the delivery day. Therefore, the intraday market vol-
ume is lower compared to the day-ahead market especially in Nordic countries due to 
sufficiently forecasted production and consumption. Sometimes forecasting congestions 
is not reliable and day-ahead capacity restrictions are made unnecessary which is also 
seen in intraday market capacity. These restricted transmission capacities from the day-
ahead market could be offered to the intraday market when more accurate forecast are 
possible to make. This offers a tool avoiding unnecessary transmission capacity limita-
tions. Still, transmission capacities are primary revaluated in the market where changes 
are firstly effecting. During unexpected network changes, the transmission capacity re-
duction is realised in the intraday market. (Fingrid 2016) However, this thesis estimate 
market impacts without scheduled outages and the intraday market is excluded from fur-
ther review.  
A part of congestion management methods are realised in the day-ahead market. 
Transmission capacity reduction measures are realised in the day-ahead market by re-
ducing day-ahead capacity of corresponding cross-zonal interconnections. Procedures 
decrease transmission in cross-zonal border and relieve internal bidding zone conges-
tion. In this thesis, one of the limiting power transfer corridors are located between 
North and South of Finland in intersection of South of the Oulujoki. This P1-cut trans-
mission is relieved by reducing transmission between FI-SE1 bidding zones. However, 
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decision for capacity reduction should be planned and informed naturally before day-
ahead auction and limits forecasting accuracy for the delivery day. This is represented 
more profoundly in chapter 5. Other congestion management methods are realised in 
balancing market. (Fingrid 2015) 
2.2.2 Balancing market 
Power system has to be operated in a way that balance is maintained between supply 
and demand. Normally, the day-ahead market is a regular market for trading commodi-
ties but forecasting demand and generation before following day is not necessarily pre-
cise and requires alternative solutions. While the day-ahead and intraday market doesn´t 
necessarily guarantee a balance between supply and demand, balancing market offers a 
tool for managing balance during operational hour and level supply and demand differ-
ences. The Nordic balancing brings larger market area available and greater disturb-
ances are operated easier. (Borggrefe & Neuhoff 2011) 
Balancing power fluctuations are enforced by Nordic TSOs in the Nordic balancing 
market. Balancing in the Nordic power system is carried mostly with TSOs in Sweden 
and Norway and their responsibility sustaining Nordic balance with cooperation of na-
tional TSOs. National TSO operates internal issues and cooperates sustaining balance in 
cross-border. Power system balance requires balancing power for operating hour by 
placing up-regulating or down-regulating bids depending on situation. Up-regulating 
bid increase production or decrease consumption and down-regulating bid decrease pro-
duction or increase consumption. Different balancing products are utilised in normal 
network situation or disturbances typically depending on balancing response and dura-
tion. 
Because of the nature of balancing markets, TSOs have agreements with each TSOs 
how power system should be balanced in same synchronous area. This is based on sys-
tem operation agreement, which guides Nordic countries implementing similar balanc-
ing methods. (Borggrefe & Neuhoff 2011) Nowadays electricity balancing guidelines 
are being implemented creating European-wide balancing energy markets and common 
rules to guarantee harmonised balancing principles in the European power system. Bal-
ancing should be reasonable without having impact on market efficiency, consumers´ or 
producers´ surplus or discrimination between market participants. Exceptions are justi-
fied in unusual situations if operational security is compromised or balancing affects 
significantly on TSOs efficiency. (ACER 2017a) 
The Nordic balancing market offers a platform for balancing generation and demand af-
ter the intraday market. For a congestion management, congestions are relieved in bal-
ancing market with countertrading and redispatching measures by increasing production 
or decreasing consumptions on areas where total bidding zone consumption is high, and 
decreasing production or increasing consumption on areas where consumption is low. 
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Therefore, the total balance between supply and demand is same while the transmission 
is lower. (Androcec & Wangensteen 2006) Countertrade and redispatching are similar 
procedures however, countertrades are utilised for cross-zonal trades and redispatching 
is utilised for internal bidding zone trades. For this thesis, main interest is to determine 
congestion management methods between redispatching and capacity reduction 
measures in order to improve internal congestion management method.  
Countertrades and redispatching are usually carried out in the balancing market by spe-
cial adjustments to relieve short-term transmission network congestions. Procedures are 
done due to other reasons than balancing management purposes and takes part in the 
special regulating market by Fingrid (2018c) which is a part of the balancing market. 
Actual countertrading and redispatching measures are partially made in OTC-market 
(Over-The-Counter) for longer congestion management needs. OTC-market is a bilat-
eral agreement between two parties directly and enables exchange if suitable offers are 
unavailable in the special regulating market. (Androcec & Wangensteen 2006) 
Special regulation utilises pay-as-bid pricing method compared to marginal pricing 
method utilised in the balancing market and therefore, share order books are separated 
from following markets. Pay-as-bid pricing method differs from a marginal pricing 
method in a way that each trade has individual price tied to the specific volume in bids. 
It denotes that actual bids are placed to the auction without creating clearing price sub-
ject to marginal cost compared to additional premium in pay-as-bid pricing. Therefore, 
bids are subject to average reference price rather than based on marginal costs. Pricing 
method is reasonable for special regulation as a result of lower liquidity compared such 
as to the day-ahead market when producer or consumer offers the actual amount of elec-
tricity to trade. (Tierney et al. 2008)  
2.3 Price formation during congestion 
2.3.1 Price formation 
This chapter represents how price is fundamentally originated from meeting supply and 
demand in an competitive ideal market and further described in electricity market when 
decision are based on rational choices. It describes determination of each participants´ 
willingness to set offer and how it leads to certain accepted price and volume. Similarly, 
changes in prices are discussed and fundamental reasons behind it. 
Demand is described subject to two factors: willingness to purchase and ability to pur-
chase certain product. Willingness itself means desire to purchase the product whereas 
ability means liquidity to enable desires. Together it represents demand´s willingness to 
purchase certain product for the certain price. Fundamentally, the price becomes limit-
ing factor as the desire to purchase product is high and leads to demand changes de-
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pending on the price level. Higher price indicates lower demand and lower price indi-
cates higher demand. (Whelan & Msefer 1996) 
The price setting behaviour is depending on demand changes of quantity and price. This 
relation between quantity and price is described with demand curve representing down-
ward slope during increasing quantities. Generally, higher the volume, lower the price 
should be in order to realise trade due to fixed incomes and inability to purchase the 
same volume with similar costs compared to lower quantities. This creates a relation be-
tween lower and higher priced substitutes where increasing price of one or another will 
effect on another substitutes price similarly. Therefore, changing incomes or prices 
shifts demand curve accordingly. (Varian 2010) 
Supply however, shows rather similar behaviour compared to demand. Similarly, supply 
is subject to two factors: willingness to sell and ability to supply certain product. Ability 
to supply represents ability to satisfy customers by offering quantities of product. This 
ability is guaranteed by inventories and production capacities and influencing to price of 
the product. High short-term demand increases production costs and influences to in-
creasing price on higher quantities. This is generally represented with supply curve 
where upward slope illustrates increasing short-term price and higher quantities repre-
sents higher difficulty and costs to produce certain product. Higher need of the product 
shows higher costs of the product. (Whelan & Msefer 1996) 
Now as described, supply responses to market changes is reversed compared to demand 
changes. While the price increase, demand´s willingness to purchase will decrease and 
supply´s willingness to sell will increase. At some point, demand exceeds supply and 
both supply and demand have intersection where price and quantity are identical. 
(Whelan & Msefer 1996) This is equilibrium point as illustrated in figure 2 where mar-
ket clearing price represents equilibrium price.  
 
Figure 2. Price formation from supply and demand curve in competitive market 
Now, the equilibrium point describes optimal price and volume where both participants 
have willingness to trade specific volumes and prices. Changes to demand or supply 
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will change equilibrium point by shifting demand or supply curve accordingly. In elec-
tricity market, the need of electricity changes between day, night and seasons and illus-
trates volatile demand behaviour. However, supply behaviour and price formation is of-
ten understood as a marginal pricing principle in the day-ahead market favoured by 
marginal costs. Then, production dispatching is based on marginal costs of the produc-
tion and creating supply curve accordingly and ensuring lower price risk for producers 
and competitive price for consumer. (Varian 2010)  
Supply and demand responses differently to price changes depending on elasticity in 
electricity market. The price elasticity denotes changes in quantity relative to changes in 
price. High elasticity indicates changes in quantity without influencing widely to the 
price and representing responsiveness of supply and demand. (Varian 2010) Demand is 
not relatively elastic to changes due to the basic need of electricity and creates virtually 
vertical demand curve. This illustrates electricity markets where few close substitutes 
for electricity produce inelastic demand such as limited choices for heating, for exam-
ple, decision between electricity and gas heating system. However, supply has more 
elasticity compared to demand caused by competitions and having a better response. 
Still, higher demand doesn´t necessarily change producer's behaviour to set higher of-
fers but changes the equilibrium accordingly (Biggar & Hesamzadeh 2014; Varian 
2010)  
Particularly, short-term demand is inelastic as a result of consumers´ unwillingness to 
respond to real-time market changes if considering below 24 hour time period (Eirgrid 
2018; Nagbe et. al. 2018). Still, long-term demand is able to respond in a limited de-
gree. (ENTSO-E 2015) However, demand side management is increasingly drawing at-
tention and indicating higher elasticity to the demand side management by shifting en-
ergy consumption to hours when electricity demand is lower.  
Price elasticity is sometimes limited due to cross-zonal border or internal congestions. 
In this case, limited quantity of available offers create higher demand for electricity and 
inelasticity of demand is reflected to the bidding zone price. Higher changes in the bid-
ding zone price compared to quantities indicates lower elasticity. The transmission limi-
tation will cause price spread in cross-zonal interconnection or decreasing elasticity in 
internal bidding area. In practice, price spread appears between adjacent bidding zone 
prices. (Biggar & Hesamzadeh 2014; Varian 2010) 
2.3.2 Price spread during congestion 
Price formation guarantees fairly priced product by taking into account market partici-
pant´s willingness to sell or buy products. Now, trade between cross-zonal borders may 
be disrupted by physical transmission network constrains caused by congestions. Con-
gestions are restrictions in the transmission network if transmission capacity is not suf-
16 
ficient to guarantee adequacy of transmission flow. It effects on uniform pricing areas 
and leads to spreading bidding zone prices. 
Bidding zone prices are uniform between bidding zones if cross-zonal transmission ca-
pacity is not limiting transmission flow and therefore, supply and demand intersection 
are identical between adjacent bidding zones. If transmission between bidding zones is 
restricted, supply in adjacent bidding zone will not guarantee all sufficient transmission 
for consumers. As a result, producers in the same bidding zone as consumers should in-
crease their production by the amount of limited transmission. (Varian 2010) As de-
scribed in 2.3.1, higher requirement of production will increase the bidding zone elec-
tricity price due to increased short-term demand and creates spreading price between ad-
jacent bidding zones. Similarly, decreasing short-term demand indicates lower price by 
the reason of restricted export to other bidding zone. 
Transmission flow is still issued while the transmission capacity is restricted between 
adjacent bidding zones. Demand tends to buy electricity at lower price from adjacent 
price area and adjacent supply tends to sell electricity to higher price area. This indi-
cates transmission flow from lower price area to higher price area in order to balance 
bidding zone prices. During a congestion, this is unavailable realise if transmission is 
restricted or demand´s willingness to buy decreases. After relieving congestion, prices 
will settle to similar equilibrium point. (Varian 2010; Frontier 2011) 
Bidding zone prices are fundamentally created in electricity market in order to control 
congestion and represent physical locations of congestions and limitations of transmis-
sion network. (Frontier 2011) If producer sells electricity from lower priced bidding 
zone to higher priced bidding zone, producer receives only lower price regarding selling 
electricity to higher priced bidding zone during congestion. This price spread multiplied 
with transmission flow through bidding zones is received congestion income represent-
ing ownerless income of the market outcome. Incomes are received by NEMOs and fur-
ther allocated to corresponding TSOs to relief congestions in long-term. (Nord Pool 
2018c) 
Congestion incomes essentially help to coordinate investments to areas where the actual 
need is located for the transmission capacity increase. Incomes are highly depending on 
restricted transmissions as a result of separated adjacent bidding zone prices. Due to 
these issues, rules and regulations for congestion management are represented in chapter 
4. Part of the congestion issues could be handled with other methods than transmission 
capacity reduction e.g. countertrading and redispatching, which are discussed in chapter 
3. (ACER 2016) 
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2.4 Socio-economic welfare in electricity markets 
Socio-economic welfare in electricity market demonstrates generally all created com-
mon good among market participants indicating wellness of the European electricity 
market. It means maximisation of the welfare for producers and consumers leading to 
higher market value and higher market efficiency. Essentially, congestion management 
methods have a certain negative impact to socio-economic welfare by decreasing the 
welfare. In order to not violate operational security limits of the transmission system, re-
lieving congestion in P1-cut transmission should be done regardless of negative welfare 
change. This chapter concentrates on socio-economic welfare change in European elec-
tricity market and how it impacts market participants.  
Socio-economic welfare is measured for European-wide market coupling area and 
changes are depending on generation, demand and capacities on cross-zonal intercon-
nections. (ENTSO-E 2015) Essentially, socio-economic welfare is depending on three 
factors: producer and consumer surplus and congestion income. Consumer and producer 
surplus indicates willingness to buy or sell specific price and volume compared to mar-
ket clearing price representing created welfare for market participants. Figure 3 explains 
definition for consumer and producer surplus which is related to market price and creat-
ed area between supply and demand curves. Socio-economic welfare is calculated for 
each bidding zone and different market outcomes change consumer and producer sur-
plus accordingly. In theory, efficient market finds reasonable price for each situation 
thus maximising benefit for consumers and producers i.e. maximising the total socio-
economic welfare in electricity market. (Varian 2010) Generally, demand curve´s lower 
slope increases demand´s surplus and similarly supply curve´s higher slope increases 
producer´s surplus. 
 
Figure 3. Consumer and producer surplus formation. 
Welfare impacts in electricity market during congestions are generally subject to price 
difference between adjacent bidding zones as the optimal welfare is compromised. As 
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described in chapter 2.3.2, separated bidding zone prices leads to lower price for other 
area and higher price for adjacent market area compared to initial congestion free situa-
tion. For consumer and producer surplus point of view, higher bidding zone price indi-
cates higher market clearing price representing negative surplus change for consumer 
and positive surplus change for producer. (ENTSO-E 2015) It means that increasing 
price compared to initial situations benefit producers in bidding area at consumer´s ex-
penses. Depending on the actual size of each surplus change, the total welfare change is 
either positive or negative however, increasing bidding zone price generally indicates 
lower total welfare in Finland.   
In general, price spread between bidding zones is represented by surplus and deficit are-
as. Deficit area occurs if production is lower than consumption and residual energy is 
imported from other bidding zones with the aim of meeting the consumption. Due to 
this, bidding zone price increases if transmission flow is restricted from lower priced 
bidding zone. Similarly, surplus area means that production is higher than consumption 
within bidding zone indicating export from adjacent bidding zones and lower bidding 
zone price. (ENTSO-E 2015) 
Figure 4 extends these conclusions where initial price p1 and quantity Q1 is represented 
without any congestions within internal bidding zone or between cross-zonal bidding 
zones. During congestion, producer and consumer welfare changes affect to changed 
price p2 and quantity Q2 and creates surplus and deficit areas. Fundamentally, bidding 
zone price in export region is lower compared to initial situation due to limited cross-
zonal capacity and sufficient production guarantees lower prices comparing to initial 
situation. This is generally possible if marginal costs are lower than average marginal 
costs in the adjacent market area. Still, full utilisation of the transmission capacity con-
tributes lower price spread between surplus and deficit areas, however, not necessarily 
make price difference non-existent. The idea is similar in import situation where bid-
ding zone price is higher compared to adjacent bidding zone and leading importing elec-
tricity from bidding zone where price is lower. (ENTSO-E 2015) In other words, supply 
and demand will not create identical price between surplus and deficit area as a result of 
congestion. The equilibrium between bids and offers will move right or left accordingly 
until the balance is realised. This is based on TSO´s given commercial transmission ca-
pacity to cross-zonal interconnections.  
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Figure 4. Consumer and producer surplus change after congested adjacent bidding 
zones. (Adapted from ENTSO-E 2015) 
Congestions lead eventually to price spread between import and export region and cre-
ates congestion income representing ownerless income of the market outcome. These 
congestion incomes collected by NEMOs are further divided between cross-border 
transmission owners i.e. TSOs as described in chapter 2.3.2. However, congestion in-
comes regarding to socio-economic welfare tries to express bidding zone limitations and 
how much congestion limits possible consumer and producer welfare. In this case, con-
sumers in import region witness welfare decrease and consumers in export region wit-
ness welfare increase. Similarly, producers in import region witness welfare increase 
and producers in export region witness welfare decrease. (Energinet et. al. 2014) 
In addition to producer and consumer welfare, calculating congestion incomes guaran-
tees that price coupling algorithm notices bidding zone congestion while seeking the 
most optimal solution. As a result, maximising the sum of consumer and producer sur-
plus and congestion income guarantees efficiency and optimised solution noticing every 
market participants in each situation. (Energinet et. al. 2014) 
Changing supply and demand caused by congestion is one of the key observations when 
calculating socio-economic welfare. Congestion in import region typically increases 
bidding zone price and implies consumer welfare loss and producer welfare increase. 
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This is subject to surplus area changes as represented in figure 4 and forces consumers 
to use internal bidding zone production offers and impacting to higher market clearing 
price. However, positive producer surplus change and negative consumer surplus 
change does not necessarily imply decrease into total socio-economic welfare change. 
In this case, the total welfare change is negative if absolute consumer surplus change is 
higher than producer surplus change indicating relatively higher change for consumer 
surplus compared to producer surplus. Therefore, the absolute value for socio-economic 
welfare in electricity market is not relevant, only the change of total welfare is relevant 
in different transmission network situations. 
Taking into account different bidding zones in European-wide capacity allocation in fu-
ture, main challenges are encountered how socio-economic welfare change is divided to 
the whole European market area. Different bidding zones may encounter situations 
where such as one bidding zone is encountering surplus increase for consumer but other 
bidding zone is encountering surplus decrease for consumer. Therefore, socio-economic 
welfare maximisation is a matter of European-wide optimisation in order to notice Eu-
ropean market participants the most beneficial manner. Then, participants issue inevita-
bly either positive or negative welfare change depending on transmission network situa-
tion compared to previous network situations such as situations during previous days. 
Although, fully maximised European welfare in electricity market is restricted due to 
political and national interests. (ENTSO-E 2015)  
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3. TRANSMISSION CAPACITY CALCULATION 
AND CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
Aim of the capacity calculation is to define maximum allowed transmission capacities 
that can be given to the market without exceeding operational security limits. Capacity 
calculation should be efficient and based on fair procedures without reducing transmis-
sion capacities unnecessarily. It means necessity to minimise market impacts and sus-
taining sufficient transmission system operation. 
Limitations within bidding zones might cause a need to decrease cross-zonal capacities 
in order to relief internal congestion. In these cases, it is important to review the most 
efficient way to relieve congestion with different procedures and how decision might ef-
fect to market participants. Review gives a foundation to avoid undue discrimination be-
tween internal or cross-zonal flows which are more profoundly reviewed in chapter 4. 
Therefore, congestion management should be utilised without affecting cross-zonal 
transmission capacity excessively. 
3.1 Congestion management in transmission network 
Transmission flow limitations in internal or cross-zonal network elements create con-
gestion situations if the transmission capacity is not sufficient as described in chapter 
2.3.2. Therefore, open market principles are not guaranteed if transmission capacities 
are limited by TSOs. As a part of the thesis, transmission capacities limitations could be 
discriminatory for market participants and therefore, restricting potential socio-
economic welfare requires appropriate congestion management procedures. 
Congestion management in capacity calculation phase is fundamentally based on deci-
sion between cross-zonal capacity reduction and countertrading and redispatching 
measures depending on overloads and estimated congestion management costs in the 
transmission system. Congestion management procedures variates between European 
TSOs and capacity reduction procedures are commonly realised among Central Europe-
an countries due to excessive congestions in internal and cross-zonal trade (ACER 
2016).  
Given capacity between FI-SE1 bidding zones i.e. RAC-cut transmission is an im-
portant driver for congestion management as a result of it supplies significant amount of 
electricity to Finland and guarantees relatively low energy prices by Swedish and Nor-
wegian imports. High imports to the south though the P1-cut transmission may cause in-
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ternal congestion management issues increasingly in future. (Fingrid 2015) Increasing 
internal transmission is based on the third interconnected transmission between FI-SE1 
bidding zones, upcoming Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant and increasing wind power in 
Northern Finland and Sweden. At the same time, old combined heat and power plants 
and old nuclear power plants will be shut down in certain time frame which are largely 
located in Southern Finland. These issues result increasing surplus in Northern Finland 
and increasing deficit in Southern Finland and raises uncertainties to congestion man-
agement. Changes toward to renewable energy resources will be primary change pro-
duction to Northern Finland hence surplus in the north will be greater in future. (Fingrid 
2018a) 
Excessive internal transmissions are realised by short-, medium- and long-term conges-
tion management methods. Long-term congestion management fundamentally includes 
transmission network investments in order to physically increase transmission capacity. 
Reinforcing congested lines are primary solution in long-term while the bidding zone 
reconfiguration is another possible method. Reconfiguration is a medium-term conges-
tion management method to coordinate bidding zone border locations where conges-
tions typically occur. Both methods are realised within several years. (Frontier 2011) 
This thesis concentrates on short-term congestion management due to need for im-
proved methods for taking into account market impacts in capacity calculation phase. 
Short-term congestion management methods include countertrades and redispatching 
which relieve congestions directly after made transactions by shifting production closer 
to the demand as represented in chapter 2.2.2. However, use of countertrades or redis-
patching are relatively rare in special regulating market since intraday market offers 
may assist congestion management. In both markets TSOs can ask for up-regulating and 
down-regulating offers at their expenses to manage transmission congestions. Some-
times bilateral trades are utilised to redispatch within Finnish bidding zone if merely 
one redispatching offer is available. Still, countertrades and redispatching don´t elimi-
nate physical long-term congestion and investments should be made to the transmission 
network in order to avoid future congestions. (Dijk & Willems 2009) 
Alternatively, congestion are relieved with cross-zonal transmission capacity reduction 
measures instead of countertrades or redispatching. Transmission capacity reduction re-
stricts given capacity to the market between bidding zones and restricts congested inter-
nal transmission. While the RAC-cut transmission is reduced, it forces demand to buy 
electricity from internal bidding zone area and relieves congestion occurred in P1-cut 
transmission and similarly in RAC-cut transmission. Naturally, this method has direct 
impacts to electricity market price and reduces overall socio-economic welfare in Fin-
land subject to decreasing consumer surplus and increasing producer surplus. (ACER 
2016). Still, this method could be inaccessible during high consumption and transmis-
sion in summers due to insufficient supply in Finnish bidding zone.  
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Redispatching may not be possible to realise during congestions in operational security 
point of view. Thermal limitations and power oscillation may occur especially during an 
outage such as in Fenno-Scan connection. In this situation, redispatching is inaccessible 
in Northern deficit area while power flow from south to north utilises all P1-cut trans-
mission capacity. Situation is challenging to utilise without limiting cross-border trans-
mission capacity. Still, scenario is not expected when P1-cut has been reinforced in re-
cent years and wind power plants are installed in Northern Finland lowering the RAC-
cut transmission need due to higher self-sufficiency of electricity. (Fingrid 2018a) 
3.2 Determining the transmission capacity 
While understanding the foundation of congestion in earlier chapters, transmission ca-
pacity calculation takes into account technical limitations of the power system in order 
to define maximum capacities that can be given for allocation. Reduction of cross-zonal 
transmission capacities may compromise market efficiency if alternative method shows 
lower market impacts. Therefore, foundation for determining transmission capacity is 
reviewed and causes of limited transmission capacity is represented during normal 
transmission states.  
Transmission capacity is a maximum capacity that can be offered to the market without 
compromising operational security. Capacity limitations cause congestion situations oc-
casionally as a result of dynamic stability, thermal limitation or system security policies. 
Often transmission capacity is understood as maximum transmission that withstand di-
mensioning fault i.e. N-1 criteria without violating operational security limits. 
Determining transmission capacity is based on considering technical characteristics of 
the transmission system and operational security constrains. Measuring merely physical 
transmission capacity is not sufficient sustaining reliability of the transmission system. 
Operational security limit e.g. N-1 criteria is primary measured by determining stability 
during contingencies in Finland where higher operational security constrains limit phys-
ical capacity depending on transmission and fault situations. Therefore, given transmis-
sion capacity to the market is not a sum of lines´ physical capacities. (Fingrid 2015) 
NTC (Net Transfer Capacity) is currently used calculation method in the electricity 
market in Nordic and Baltic States providing allocation of available transmission capac-
ity on each bidding zone border. It is a maximum commercial capacity taking into ac-
count physical transmission grid and operational security constrains. This physical 
transmission capacity is reduced by reliability margin is a foundation for allowable 
commercial transmission capacity where reliability margin takes into account calcula-
tion uncertainties. After considering reliability margin, transmission capacity is a given 
maximum commercial exchange to the market. (Fingrid 2015) 
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Transmission capacity calculation requires coordination between TSOs to utilise net-
work efficiently while noticing physical constrains. Optimisation requires essentially 
cooperation between TSOs if allocated interconnected lines are between adjacent TSOs. 
Neighbouring countries will coordinate NTC calculations for common border by TSOs 
where both TSOs calculate their NTC capacities and the lowest NTC will be selected to 
the allowed commercial transmission capacity. In the capacity calculation, grid topology 
with production and load forecasts and estimated exchanges are forecasted and utilised 
as a basis in the calculations aiming to maximise allowed commercial transmission ca-
pacity. These are coordinated with limited degree with other TSOs in Nordic. (Plancke 
et al. 2016) 
During a normal transmission network circumstances, TSOs should allocate their max-
imum cross-zonal capacity to the market without primary choosing capacity reduction 
as a general measure compared to countertrading and redispatching. Still, TSOs have 
right to reduce transmission capacity during planned transmission outages in order to 
make maintenance in transmission system. Faults and other disturbances are threatening 
operational security where insurmountable issues could be resolved by reducing trans-
mission capacity. (Fingrid 2015)  
Maximum commercial capacities are illustrated in figure 5 as a result of transmission 
capacity calculation. Given transmission capacity to the market between Norway and 
Finland is merged to the RAC-cut transmission capacity since Norway transmission is 
excluded from commercial use while the physical maximum transmission capacity is 
100 MW. This is due to fact that transmission between Norway and Finland has been 
historically low and exclusion from commercial use is agreed with corresponding TSOs. 
(Fingrid 2015; Fingrid 2018a) Maximum transmissions are depending on direction of 
the transmission where excessive export is hard to realise from smaller transmission 
system due to lower inertia (Kundur et al. 2004). However, it is important to notice that 
represented transmission capacities in figure 5 are not necessarily possible to realise to-
gether and therefore, one arrow shows maximum capacity between two points. 
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Figure 5. Maximum commercial transmission capacities in Finland. (Adapted from 
Fingrid 2015; 2018c) 
Fenno-Skan import significancy arises for congestion management in Southern Finland: 
if P1-cut or RAC-cut transmission is limited, Fenno-Skan import is increased with nor-
mal balancing methods to decrease congestions in corresponding transmissions. Con-
gestion issues are relieved also by countertrades with Estonian bidding zone while the 
importance of transmission between Finland and Estonia have been increased in several 
years. In some transmission network situations, countertrades between adjacent bidding 
zones are unavailable such as due to scheduled outage and therefore, redispatching 
within Finnish bidding zone is realised. (Fingrid 2018a) 
3.3 Technical limitations of transmission capacity 
Limitations in network elements and N-1 criteria creates starting point for sustaining 
transmission system reliability. As represented in chapter 3.2, technical transmission 
capacity is limited due to stability, voltage or thermal limitations and each constrain 
may limit transmission capacity in certain situations. Transmission capacity is calculat-
ed for cross-zonal interconnections and also for Fingrid´s internal purposes for internal 
cuts i.e. transmission between north and south.  
Thermal limitations are subject to high load currents and physical constrains of the 
transmission system components. Constrains guarantee that high load currents will not 
damage components where limitations are primarily as a result of excessive tempera-
tures and loading situations. Weather conditions e.g. temperatures and wind effect sig-
nificantly estimating loading situations. Normally, nominal values for transmission sys-
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tem components are foundation for determining maximum transmission capacity. (Fin-
grid 2015) 
Transmission system stability is another aspect to the restricted transmission capacity 
where oscillations between capacitive and inductive loads create instability. Synchro-
nous machines does not necessarily sustain synchronisation in small disturbances or 
changes in rapid transmission network configuration and may create either unstable 
steady-state or transient oscillation. Issues occur especially in RAC- and P1-cut trans-
mission where long lines with high loads and compensations may create stability con-
cerns. High reactive power compensation in the transmission system create higher volt-
age to end of the line and supports sustaining voltage quality. Still, higher compensation 
has a higher risk for oscillation especially after contingencies. In Finland, rotor angle 
stability issues are more evident than thermal limitations due to long transmission dis-
tance and strong transmission system withstanding thermal limitations. (Fingrid 2015) 
Voltage stability which is an ability to keep voltage within limits during normal trans-
mission states and disturbances. It is highly associated with reactive power control and 
compensation due to reactive impedance of a line. High reactive power compensation 
may cause stability issues during disturbances especially if transmission flows are high-
er than usual. High voltage drop between start and end of the line could be an indication 
of voltage stability issue in the transmission system. In over compensated network, this 
is hard to validate when voltage is sustaining nominal levels without evident voltage 
drop. (Kundur et al. 2004)  
Instead, transient stability is due to large and sudden changes in the transmission sys-
tem. Changes cause fast output reduction and turbine has no time to adapt changes and 
derives faster rotor speed indicating rotor angle stability issue. If fault duration is suffi-
ciently long, it may lead to loss of synchronisation. Naturally, active and reactive power 
oscillation creates variation also to frequency stability representing ability to keep fre-
quency changes within deviation. Frequency below accepted limits will cause genera-
tors to disconnect from the system if sufficient balancing coordination is not realised. 
Frequency stability issues are encountered particularly in island operation when fre-
quency oscillation is more evident compared to normal transmission state. Still, voltage 
oscillations are more common than frequency oscillation. (Kundur et al. 2004) 
These constrains limit an operation of P1-cut and RAC-cut transmission which general-
ly states operating range for the Finnish transmission system as represented in figure 6. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, electricity is imported from Sweden as a general meas-
ure and constrains are typically related to dynamic stability and voltage levels between 
FI-SE1 bidding zones. Limiting factors are depending primary on direction of power 
flow between Finland and Sweden and how much of this electricity is transferred to the 
south. This tends to follow Nordic hydrological situation. (Fingrid 2018a) 
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Figure 6. Operating range diagram limiting transmission capacity  
The N-1 criteria is one of the key limiting factors for transmission capacity depending 
on scheduled or unintentional outages and switching situations to guarantee operational 
security during major outages. Transmission domain isn´t static and operating diagram 
changes shape based on e.g. temperatures, consumption and hydrological situations. 
Generally, higher consumption allows higher RAC-imports from Sweden but requires 
the P1-cut transmission lean more to the south in order to sustain operational security. 
(Fingrid 2018a) 
Figure 6 illustrates relation between P1- and RAC-cut transmission and how excessive 
transmission leads to increasing transmission to one another. P1-cut and RAC-cut 
transmissions are essential study measurements whether relieving congestion in RAC-
cut transmission has an effect on P1-cut transmission. Below figure 7 illustrates P1-cut 
and RAC-cut week average transmission in 2017 and concludes the relation between 
two transmissions. Week average values level high volatility between hours of a day 
and days of a week. 
 
Figure 7. Moving week average transmission in P1- and RAC-cut in 2017. (Adapted 
from Fingrid 2018c) 
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Positive transmission flow indicate imports from RAC-cut transmission and P1-cut 
transmission to south. Both transmission shows a relation and changes generally impact 
on one another with moderately strong correlation coefficient of 0,66. Because of this, 
lower import in the RAC-cut transmission shows moderately strong positive correlation 
to lower transmission in the P1-cut and therefore, transmission capacity reduction indi-
cate lower transmission in congested P1-cut. However, the highest P1-cut transmission 
is measured during May–August and indicates high imports from adjacent bidding 
zones and limitations in P1-cut during summer. Similar correlation of 0,61 in 2016 con-
firms presupposition of P1- and RAC-cut transmission similarities and high transmis-
sion in summers. 
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4. EUROPEAN REGULATION RELATED TO 
TRANSMISSION CAPACITY CALCULATION 
AND CONGESTION MANAGEMENT  
Efficiency in European electricity market requires common guidelines. These guidelines 
are created to aim into “secure, sustainable and affordable energy supplies” (Mautino 
2013). Because of this, target model for electricity markets defines harmonised rules for 
European electricity market where motivation is to provide common rules for TSOs, 
NEMOs and benefits for energy producers and consumers. Fully functioning electricity 
markets requires internal markets where efficiency and renewable energy resources are 
noticed. (EC 2015/1222) Chapter represents European regulation regarding to transmis-
sion capacity calculation of the day-ahead market and denotes foundation for congestion 
management without undue discrimination. In future, decision between countertrading, 
redispatching and transmission capacity reduction is verified from regulatory perspec-
tive and common methodologies shall take into account rules to avoid undue discrimi-
nation in capacity calculation and allocation. TSOs are obligated to show that the 
transmission capacity reduction on cross-zonal interconnections is justified compered to 
alternative measures in their transmission network area. 
4.1 Capacity allocation and congestion management guideline 
One of the biggest market codes are related to Commission regulation of CACM guide-
line (Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management) (EC 2015/1222). Regulation 
offers rules for cross-border capacity calculations and methods for countertrade and re-
dispatching. These guidelines aim to harmonise European market “at least at regional 
level” however, utilising whole European electricity market for capacity allocation is 
common long-term target while the capacity calculation is coordinated regionally. This 
chapter presents regulation aims to effective competition and capacity optimisation is-
sues. Related to thesis, harmonised rules are established based on three methods: ca-
pacity calculation, congestion management and trading of electricity. 
Efficiency and optimisation is one of important themes in CACM guideline after notic-
ing congestion situations especially in Central Europe. Despite of different perspectives 
in development of electricity market, Member States are required to fulfil requirements 
and TSOs are required to search reasonable solutions in order to acknowledge CACM 
regulation (ACER 2016). Common rules are believed to bring efficiency utilising the 
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transmission system and offering a better platform for variable energy resources by 
lowering a threshold for joining to electricity market.  
Countertrading and redispatching are part of the capacity allocation principles as repre-
sented in Articles 3, 25, 35 and 74 of CACM guideline. CACM guideline shows princi-
ples utilising countertrading and redispatching in order to control congestion without 
discriminating market participants. Primary, actions should be coordinated with the 
purpose of attempting efficiency and operational security. Coordination guarantees that 
each TSO should follow common methodologies for countertrading and redispatching 
actions. 
Regulation gives rules determine how and when countertrading and redispatching can 
be utilised legitimately with reasonable costs. As Article 35 (EC 2015/1222) states, rea-
sonable costs for countertrading and redispatching are based on either common price 
level in specific time frame or incurred transparent costs in electricity market. These are 
primary measures in congestion management stated by ACER if costs between counter-
trading and redispatching and capacity reduction measure costs are not distinctively dif-
ferent. Costs of countertrading and redispatching measures should be transparently cal-
culated in accordance with common methodology. Costs are divided subject to such as 
“polluter-pays principle” which tends to prevent congestion issues in cross-border 
transmission as a result of potential penalties (ACER 2016).  
Although, CACM guideline suggest that the transmission capacity reduction measures 
should work accordingly to operational security principles. Therefore, capacity reduc-
tion is justified in order to guarantee operational security which is a primary driver for 
congestion management. Transmission capacity reductions are generally chosen as a re-
sult of lower costs for TSOs compared to countertrading and redispatching while the 
impacts for electricity market are essentially created during congestions. (ACER 2016). 
4.2 Undue discrimination rules for cross-zonal exchange 
Setting undue discriminatory rules are part of the European Union´s third energy pack-
age achieving harmonisation and concluding regulations and directives related to energy 
and open market. Undue discrimination rules are set by European Parliament and the 
Council (EC 2009/714) where particularly rules for accessing and utilising the transmis-
sion system are represented and make possible transparency and new competitors in 
competitive electricity market. These guidelines thrive to improve overall competition, 
liquidity and welfare. For TSOs point of view, discrimination during limited transmis-
sion capacity should be studied. 
The awareness of undue discrimination have been raised during the integration of Euro-
pean electricity market. Currently, common European interest should be favoured in 
part of national interests and therefore, not only national interests are treated, but Euro-
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pean electricity market should be noticed. These issues are concluded in the Commis-
sion undue discrimination regulation where independence of market participants´ inter-
ests is one of the key assumption. Rules states that person should not use authority in 
order to influence producer, consumer or TSOs interest. Rules should guarantee inde-
pendency for participant by removing interests between market participants, encourag-
ing investments and guaranteeing access to the open market. Without vertical and hori-
zontal influence by independent TSOs, part of an undue discrimination principles 
should be guaranteed. (EC 2009/714)  
Internal congestion management is one of the key motives for existing regulation (EC 
2009/714). Typically, the transmission capacity reduction is favoured in Central Europe 
in order to control internal bidding zone congestion with lower costs for TSOs. This will 
shift capacity limitation from inside of the bidding zone to cross-border causing limited 
transmission capacity between bidding zones. This have an effect on adjacent bidding 
zones and have an impact on spreading prices. (ACER 2016)  
Discrimination between cross-border is matter of price spread of adjacent bidding 
zones. For consumers´ point of view, other consumers in adjacent bidding zone may 
witness lower electricity price during congested situation causing different position de-
pending on which bidding zone consumers are situated. Fundamentally, the price dis-
crimination exists if consumers have a decision between similar products with similar 
marginal costs but witness different prices among products. Therefore, consumers situ-
ated in lower priced bidding zone benefit situation since the identical product is sold at 
lower price. However, consumers in higher priced bidding zone found the situation dis-
criminating after buying the product at higher price. (Armstrong 2006; Varian 2010) 
Price spread occurs essentially due to physical restrictions and the price spread itself is 
not necessarily understood discriminative. It might be discriminative if dominant market 
participant has possibility to adverse free competition. In this case, restricting cross-
zonal transmission capacities with no evident reasons might discriminate participants. 
(Armstrong 2006) Now, the main issue is to detect whether TSOs ability to restrict trade 
is found discriminating. Given transmission capacities between bidding zones have sub-
stantial influence on cross-zonal transmission flow impacting on the market settlement 
during congestion and further into total welfare as represented in chapter 2.4.  
Due to this, ACER has made several statements complementing undue discrimination 
rules. Statements are discussed more profound by ACER (2016) which states rather 
strict recommendations to fulfil regulation. ACER recommendations are based on Arti-
cle 16 and Annex I 1.7 of Regulation (EC 2009/714) where obligation to maximise 
cross-zonal transmission capacity is represented. ACER states that congestion should be 
primary assigned without reducing cross-zonal transmission capacity in order to limit 
undesired market impacts. This is considered by ACER the most reasonable in order to 
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manage congestions without affecting to market participants and provide transparent 
and reasonable price signals based on competitiveness of market participant.  
However, regulation (EC 2009/714) presents congestion management as a cost-
reflective in the market and presents market-based mechanism for reasonable price for-
mation. Part of an undue discrimination principles, TSOs cannot favour cross-zonal ca-
pacity reduction as a reason of congestions related costs. During a normal transmission 
network states, decision between countertrading and redispatching and transmission ca-
pacity reduction should reflect measured costs. Measured costs of transmission capacity 
reduction are matter of estimated socio-economic welfare changes. 
Although, undue discrimination is not necessarily always fulfilled in insufficient liquidi-
ty or congestion situations if congestion management compromises operational security 
and causing inefficient utility of the transmission system. Regulation states that the 
transmission capacity reduction is justified if cost efficiency and socio-economic wel-
fare is higher compared to countertrading and redispatching. Similarly, capacity reduc-
tion is justified if operational security is compromised in temporary situations such as 
scheduled and unintentional outages. Still, market based solution are required even if it 
increases TSOs congestion related costs in European-wide trade. (ACER 2016) 
4.3 EU target model and monitoring in electricity market 
The EU electricity target model provides common rules such as capacity calculation, 
day-ahead and intraday market capacity allocation. High-level guidelines attempts to 
harmonise market area and encourage market participants to invest and utilise the elec-
tricity market more efficiently based on marginal costs. Efficient operation of electricity 
market supports European Commission objectives in order to apply and increase renew-
able energy resources. These objectives are part of the renewable energy directive and 
open market principles. (Keay 2013) 
Existing methods have concerned European regulatory authorities related to congestion 
management. Different treatments of cross-border and internal exchanges have led in 
situations where transmission capacities are reduced particularly between cross-zonal 
interconnections. This indicates congestion issues in several Member States causing 
limited market efficiency especially in Central Europe. This issue is particularly due to 
internal congestions within bidding zones and challenges to relief congestion otherwise 
than limiting cross-zonal transmission. Treatment of congestion management methods 
may discriminate market participants when some market participants may have unre-
stricted access to transmission capacities while others experience scarcity situations. 
Respectively, competition among market participants in scarcity situations is limited if 
market participants have different opportunities between internal and cross-border mar-
ket. This should be organised in order to efficient functioning electricity market. (ACER 
2016) 
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The current situation is partly due to the lack of having reasonable incentives for TSOs. 
Providing reasonable incentives may offer better signals for more efficient transmission 
system from European perspective. Minimising congestion-related costs by TSOs is 
usual and leads maximising national interest by decreasing cross-border capacities. 
Limiting electricity import or export between Denmark and Germany have raised con-
cerns and may cause larger market impacts broader in market area. (ACER 2016) As a 
result, regulations are made to settle these issues in electricity market in order to harmo-
nise non-discriminatory rules for capacity allocation and congestion management.  
Regulation authorities monitor implementations of CACM guideline in accordance with 
non-discriminatory rules. Regulation authorities monitor that the day-ahead and intra-
day market coupling solutions are implemented in accordance of regulation. Authorities 
expect TSOs to comply and implement guidelines and creating consensus among TSOs. 
This means as well sharing “information on capacity calculation and redispatching and 
countertrading cost sharing” for authorities (ACER 2016). Authorities concentrate mon-
itoring on expected and actual impacts and calculations of cross-zonal capacities and 
deviations in accordance with non-discriminatory rules. A part of implementation of 
CACM guideline, TSOs develop proposals to National regulatory authorities for ap-
proval. Methodologies are reviewed and approved by regulators. 
 
 
34 
5. CURRENT CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
METHODS 
Fingrid´s current capacity calculation and congestion management method considers 
decision based on available redispatching resources and costs and cross-border trans-
mission capacity reduction costs. Transmission capacity reduction costs are measured 
based on estimated socio-economic welfare changes. Depending on costs of capacity 
reduction and redispatching, procedure with the lowest socio-economic costs is select-
ed. This works in accordance of planned grid outages when estimating best procedure 
for different situations. The procedure relieving the P1-cut transmission should be 
scheduled one day in advance before the operational day due to fact that day-ahead 
cross-border transmission capacities should be given to the market before implicit auc-
tion period. Still, a part of congestion management methods are realised during implicit 
auction by allocating transmission capacities between bidding zones efficiently. Current 
method has been realised since published internal report in 2013.  
As represented in chapter 2.2.2, countertrading is realised in cross-zonal trade and re-
dispatching is realised within bidding zone. The main interest in this thesis are conges-
tion issues due to P1-cut transmission insufficiency and therefore, congestion manage-
ment method issues are represented only redispatching manner. This chapter represents 
currently used methods between redispatching and transmission capacity reduction in 
capacity calculation phase in Finnish internal bidding zone.  
5.1 Realising redispatching 
In order to redispatch, Fingrid purchases up-regulation power where the demand is 
higher and purchases down-regulation power where the demand is lower. This is based 
on two principles: either realising redispatching resources after intraday gate closure 
from special regulating market which is a part of a balancing market or determine the 
need for actions before the delivery day. Due to informing the capacities for a day be-
fore the delivery day, the decision depending on estimated costs between redispatching 
and capacity reduction before delivery day.  
When comparing procedures a day before the delivery day, estimations are uncertain 
especially for up-regulation redispatching and during unusually high or low estimated 
redispatching costs. Costs are related especially to time before delivery hour where ap-
proaching closer to the delivering hour will increase costs accordingly. Represented 
procedures a day before the delivery day offer such as sufficient time for producers pre-
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paring for unexpected production changes meaning that e.g. thermal power plants re-
quire time for starting production and cannot be started in certain time frame. Necessity 
for faster starting leads such as utilising gas turbines as a replacement for thermal power 
plants and will have an impact on realised costs accordingly due to higher marginal 
costs. Therefore, sufficiently reliable forecasting for congestion management methods is 
essential in order to keep costs reasonable. 
The redispatching cost unpredictability derives from uncertain electricity demand as de-
scribed partially in chapter 2.3.1. While the estimation in the day-ahead market is rela-
tively reliable based on earlier days, balancing market price estimation does not follow 
similar certainty due to rapidly changing realised volumes and market situation e.g. 
scheduled or unintentional outages. Similarly, production or consumption location ef-
fect increasingly to redispatching costs if merely few offers are possible realised. 
Redispatching costs are calculated by multiplying volume and price for up- and down-
regulation depending on received offers. Typically, redispatching prices and volumes 
follows balancing market price since offers are placed within a day to corresponding 
market. (Fingrid 2018c) In practice, transmission system operator ask different produc-
ers or consumers from the market or bilaterally to commit up- or down-regulating at a 
certain hours. Redispatching costs are defined 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑝𝑢𝑝 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ + 𝑝𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ,    (1) 
where pup and pdown represents redispatching up- and down-regulating price (€/MWh) 
and Vredispatching is required redispatching volume (MWh) which is identical for up- and 
down-regulation situations. It is important to notice that positive pdown price represents 
positive cash flow for TSOs. It is due to fact that such as producer is already sold elec-
tricity to the day-ahead market and producer has received a compensation to produce 
electricity to the market. When down-regulating situation occurs, producer should real-
ise down-regulating bids if price exceeds above its marginal costs. Producer saves oper-
ational costs without realising production for certain hour and the profit from down-
regulation is received by TSO. In this case, TSO´s total redispatching costs are calculat-
ed from up-regulating costs which are reduced by the amount of down-regulating costs. 
Similarly, up- and down-regulation could be realised with consumers´ bids instead of 
producers´ bids. 
According to Fingrid´s (2013) former estimations, requirements below 300 MW offers 
sufficient availability for redispatching as represented in figure 8. Values are based on 
balancing market liquidity which changes accordingly in different transmission situa-
tions. The availability for redispatching means balancing power availability in certain 
location within bidding area. Occasionally, availability is not sufficient as a result of 
different locations of production units i.e. only limited amount of balancing power bids 
for redispatching are usable. Limited amount of available up-regulating balancing pow-
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er is a challenge especially in Southern Finland and measures are replaced by transmis-
sion capacity reductions due to higher costs. Because of this, represented procedures 
works generally and decision in intersections shows uncertainty between redispatching 
and capacity reduction.  
 
Figure 8. Decision between redispatching and transmission capacity reduction  
  (Adapted from Fingrid 2013a). 
Redispatching is firstly realised between 0–100 MW regardless of estimated transmis-
sion capacity reduction costs due to its lower impacts to the market. During 100–300 
MW overload, higher unit price of capacity reduction will increase readiness to realise 
redispatching due to undesirable market impacts. Then, redispatching is realised if rea-
sonably priced resources are available. (Fingrid 2016) Currently, 30–50 €/MWh repre-
sents the deviation between redispatching and capacity reduction costs and justification 
between actions is not explicit. Therefore, each action are valuated separately within 
100–300 MW and 30–50 €/MWh which method shows lower market impacts.   
Usable market bids are guaranteed sufficiently if overloading is below 100 MW. Above 
this, redispatching availability might be compromised occasionally when excessively 
high volume doesn´t necessarily guarantee resources availability to produce electricity 
at reasonable costs. Measures above 300 MW are not reliably available and therefore, 
redispatching is realised until 300 MW and remaining requirement is realised with 
transmission capacity reduction. (Fingrid 2016 & 2018c) 
5.2 Cross-border transmission capacity reduction 
Cross-border transmission capacities are maximised and offered to the market in normal 
transmission situations. During scheduled outages and congestions, cross-zonal trans-
mission may compromise operational security and initiates capacity reduction. Capacity 
reduction impacts are non-existent to socio-economic welfare if capacity reduction 
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measures are not restricting the actual transmission flow but increases a risk for conges-
tion. If the transmission flow is restricted, TSOs should avoid unjustified impacts on 
electricity price difference between FI and SE1 bidding zones and effecting on socio-
economic welfare unreasonably.  
Congestion situations are justified by capacity reduction if redispatching measure shows 
higher costs and lower social welfare. The actual impact on social welfare is understood 
particularly for producers and consumers and estimation should be based on European-
wide market area. For TSOs, capacity reduction does not increase congestion related 
costs for TSOs by informing lower capacities to the market but lowers generally socio-
economic welfare for market participants as described in 2.4. Still, current method has 
been based on the Finnish bidding zone estimation without noticing European-wide im-
pacts.   
Decision for capacity reduction relies on price estimation and how much capacity reduc-
tion may cost on the next couple days since the capacity reduction procedure should be 
planned and informed before 10:30 am CET before operational day. It depends on price 
level and estimated price spread between Finnish and Swedish SE1 bidding zone where 
higher price spread indicates higher socio-economic impacts of reduced capacity. Price 
estimation is essentially subject to historical prices, load and production estimations 
highlighting possible congestion issues and made possible to determine the need for ca-
pacity reduction. Estimations and market impacts are hard to validate explicitly and 
therefore, overall principles are followed. (Fingrid 2013a) Still, estimation raises a risk 
that capacities are reduced unnecessary if operational situation changes. This situation 
tends to support redispatching since realisation during operation hours could be can-
celled and market impacts are avoided or minimised.  
Currently, overall principles are estimated in Fingrid´s internal (Fingrid 2013a) report 
based on estimated market impacts. Earlier, transmission capacity reduction impacts 
were measured by estimating price spread as represented above and estimating price be-
tween cross-zonal and multiplied with corresponding volume. Market impacts were es-
sentially estimated based on FI and SE1 bidding zones but also with SE3 and EE bid-
ding zones. Also, it were estimated that RAC-cut transmission capacity changes impacts 
to corresponding bidding zones. Based on these and historical values, report states that 
few euros per MWh change is expected depending on how extended reduction measures 
are realised. Higher reduction measures that limits cross-zonal flow will create higher 
price difference between adjacent bidding zones and creates generally higher market 
impacts during congested transmission states. Higher negative market impacts increase 
related capacity reduction costs. This clarifies that capacity reduction costs are greater if 
bidding zone prices are significantly separated.  
Costs of capacity reductions are compared to redispatching costs if transmission capaci-
ty reduction costs are estimated within 30–50 €/MWh as represented in figure 8. De-
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pending on costs between redispatching and capacity reduction, procedure with lowest 
costs will be applied within 30–50 €/MWh. Still, decision is depending on estimation 
accuracy in redispatching and capacity reduction costs. As described in chapter 5.1, re-
dispatching has limited estimation accuracy compared to capacity reduction. It shows 
that liquidity in balancing market causes uncertainty between different procedures and 
redispatching could be chosen if socio-economic welfare is similar compared to capaci-
ty reduction (Fingrid 2013a).  
Still, redispatching is reliably available within 0–300 MW requirement and congestions 
above 300 MW are relieved with cross-border capacity reduction if reasonably redis-
patching resources are unavailable. The importance of capacity reduction increases dur-
ing extensive overloading situations and transmission capacity reduction is generally 
justified. Estimated capacity reduction costs could be also lower than 30 €/MWh repre-
senting generally limited congestion and relatively low impact to the market. 
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6. IMPROVED METHODS FOR CONGESTION 
MANAGEMENT 
Undue discrimination in congestion management are represented distinctly by ACER 
(2016) while the issue has not resolved in other related publications. This study aims to 
conclude undue discrimination rules to congestion management methods and objective 
is to measure whether redispatching or transmission capacity reduction is justified re-
lieving congested P1-cut transmission. Results are foundation to NTC capacity calcula-
tion principles where capacity reduction potentials are measured based on market im-
pacts. Redispatching costs are estimated by taking into account uncertainties and redis-
patching price level before operating hour. The day-ahead market simulation allows ca-
pacity reduction costs to be measured more accurately compared to countertrading and 
redispatching costs due to higher market liquidity and simulated market outcomes. Re-
sults verify consumer and producer surplus change impacts in order to determine justi-
fied method for congestion management.  
Due to the applied Simulation Facility market tool, market impacts are estimated more 
profoundly in European-wide trade compared to current congestion management meth-
od. Simulation Facility market tool simulates market outcomes based on actual day-
ahead market algorithm. Earlier, method based on assumptions and general calculation 
without utilising any simulation tools and therefore, this study further develops the cur-
rently applied congestion management method as described in chapter 5. 
6.1 Approach 
The approach is divided into four main parts. First choosing comparable week periods 
to show similar market situations when congestions occurs. After that, Simulation Facil-
ity market tool is tested whether algorithm produces reliable market outcomes. Then, 
these week periods are analysed by utilising Simulation Facility market tool with differ-
ent capacity reduction measures. This essentially brings into light the socio-economic 
costs of capacity reduction and shows how the socio-economic welfare changes during 
congested situations. Fourthly, Simulation Facility market tool results are compared 
with separately estimated redispatching costs and selected congestion management 
method is represented. Finally, reliability of results will be verified by analysing espe-
cially redispatching cost uncertainties and its effects on study results.   
In order to evaluate a decision sufficiently reliably between capacity reduction and re-
dispatching measures, firstly week periods are selected from years 2016–2017 based on 
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Fingrid´s Open Data and Nord Pool market data. Selected week periods indicate suita-
ble situations for congested P1-cut and RAC-cut transmission and represents favourable 
situations for transmission capacity reduction or redispatching. In other words, conges-
tion situations in P1-cut transmission and price separations between FI-SE1 bidding 
zones indicates favourable week periods for further analysis. Used data is further dis-
cussed in chapter 6.4.  
After indicating suitable week periods for further study, simulation tool is tested wheth-
er algorithm produces identical market results compared to historical market outcomes. 
The simulation environment is based on historical supply and demand offers of selected 
week periods in the day-ahead market. These inputs are built-in in Simulation Facility 
which utilises Euphemia –algorithm (European Union Pan-European Hybrid Electricity 
Market Integration Algorithm) to simulate day-ahead market outcomes. Simulation Fa-
cility market tool makes possible to analyse market impacts of transmission capacity re-
ductions. Simulation tool is further described in chapter 6.3 and reliability is tested in 
chapter 6.5. 
Then, those periods are positioned to the simulation. In practice, algorithm calculates 
estimated transmission flows and bidding zone prices subject to historical offers and 
transmission capacity restrictions. Only transmission capacity restrictions can be set to 
the simulation. Reductions are set on every hundred megawatt until -600 MW is 
reached to show changing market outcomes on created price and welfare compared to 
initial situation. Analysis starts recognising market impacts from individual weeks and 
reoccurring impacts are represented to show how RAC-cut capacity restrictions general-
ly impact to the market. The general view of congestions is estimated based on several 
week periods on each year. These are the foundation to understand the decision between 
redispatching and capacity reduction more accurately. These results introduce general 
representation on how capacity reduction impacts socio-economically to European-wide 
welfare.  
Then, redispatching costs on every reduction measures are estimated subject to balanc-
ing market prices from years 2016–2017 due to low quantities of historical redispatch-
ing measures. Estimated up- and down-regulating prices for redispatching are created 
for every quarter of a year to show more accurately seasonal impacts to the capacity re-
duction. These estimations are noticed on hourly balancing market prices and express-
ing estimated redispatching costs. Finally, decision between capacity reduction and re-
dispatching is evaluated based on which method shows lower costs in certain transmis-
sion situations. Then, results reliability is further reviewed. 
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6.2 Main assumptions measuring congestion management 
methods 
Assumptions and reasons are shown in this chapter in order to generalise market condi-
tions by simplifying study arrangements and focus on particular events related to redis-
patching during congestions without noticing outages in the transmission network. 
Therefore, data sets are selected to represent market and transmission system conditions 
and power flows essentially from recent years of 2016–2017 in order to produce rele-
vant results in practice. 
 The following assumptions are made: 
- Network outages are not involved into analysis 
- Swedish electricity import generally occurs during congestion  
- Redispatching is preferred if capacity reduction shows similar costs  
- Demand is inelastic to production changes 
- Producer´s and consumer´s bidding behaviour is static to transmission capacity 
changes 
- Congestion incomes are allocated with 50:50 distribution in calculation area 
- Russian welfare impacts are excluded from European market coupling area  
The transmission system topology is represented from years 2016–2017 offering latest 
transmission network situations and guarantees relevance of study calculations and con-
clusions for upcoming years where only week periods are selected without any network 
outages involved. Hydrologically similar years guarantees similar export and import sit-
uations in Finnish bidding zones and makes it easier to analyse different years. During 
those years, electricity import is realised regularly from Sweden to Finland and being 
more general than export situations. For the most part, export situations typically occurs 
at night and exported electricity is under three percentage of normal exchange between 
FI and SE1 bidding zones (Nord Pool 2018a). Therefore, electricity import is a general 
measure between FI-SE1 bidding zones. 
When redispatching and transmission capacity reduction shows similar impacts to the 
socio-economic welfare change depending on particular prices and volumes, redispatch-
ing is chosen for congestion management in this case. It is due to fact that capacity re-
duction is irreversible after informing capacities to the day-ahead market and decision 
for redispatching is changeable even before operational hour. Procedure lowers a risk 
for unnecessary capacity reduction if both methods shows no distinctive difference for 
socio-economic welfare change.  
As described in chapter 2.3.1, demand is reasonably inelastic to production changes 
when consumers are unwillingness or does not witness benefits to respond particularly 
to short-term market changes and creates inelasticity to the day-ahead market. There-
fore, demand consumes the electricity at almost any price without changing behaviour 
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to short-term market changes. Similar effect occurs in long-term demand with limited 
indicated elasticity. Therefore, inelasticity is assumed to represent normal condition of 
the power system in 2016–2017. However, it has been acknowledged that demand side 
response is increasing in upcoming years and should be considered potential influence 
on electricity market. Demand side management offers are included to Euphemia if cor-
responding offers are placed to the day-ahead market. 
Due to transmission capacity reduction measures between FI-SE1 bidding zones, bid-
ding behaviour might change if measures are realised in reality. Fundamentally, bidding 
is subject to pay-as-bid pricing method in the special regulation market as described in 
chapter 2.2.2 and similarly transmission capacity changes might effect on bidding be-
haviour in the day-ahead market. The issue is not noticed in Simulation Facility since 
the simulation tool utilises historical market data and causes constant bidding behaviour 
regardless of how excessive changes are made i.e. historical offers shows constant bid-
ding behaviour. Therefore in this thesis, market participants' bidding behaviour is as-
sumed to be unchanged if transmission capacity is changed.   
Simulation Facility calculates consumer and producer welfare results while congestion 
incomes should be calculated afterwards. As CACM regulation states, congestion in-
comes are distributed between adjacent bidding zones either with 50:50 distribution or 
based on ownership of cross-zonal transmission with surrounding TSOs. (ACER 2017b) 
Finnish congestion incomes are shared by 50:50 distribution with similar procedure 
among Nordic countries. However, Central European countries and Baltic States may 
allocate costs with the ownership of cross-zonal transmission while accurate ownership 
of each transmissions is not reliable available. For congestion income calculation as-
sumption, allocation by 50:50 distribution is utilised for the whole European electricity 
market.  
Nordic, Baltic States, Poland and Germany bidding zones are included to results and 
Central European countries are excluded from these results due to almost non-existing 
welfare impacts. However, market impacts are evaluated within European market cou-
pling area to verify this assumption. Still, Russian welfare has been excluded from cal-
culated data sets without being part of a European market coupling area. Russian wel-
fare is essentially represented in Finnish and Baltic States welfares since Russian offers 
are sold to corresponding countries and distorts actual European coupling area welfare. 
Because of this, the total welfare from each country is reduced by the sum of Russian 
welfare from total welfares of Finland and Baltic States if Russian import occurs. Re-
spectively, electricity import from Russia is already calculated into Finnish and Baltic 
States welfare advancing their producer surplus. This is due to fact that Russian export 
increases total welfares of Finland and Baltic States when producers has willingness to 
sell more electricity to the day-ahead market and thus increasing producer surplus. 
Transmission flow with Russia is measured by calculating commercial transmission 
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flow between Finland–Russia and Kaliningrad–Lithuania interconnection which repre-
sents interconnection from Baltic States to Russia. Transmission flow to Baltic State is 
divided evenly with corresponding countries (Fingrid Open Data 2018; Elering 2018; 
AST 2018; Litgrid 2018) and each interconnection flow is multiplied with actual areal 
price to notice included Russian welfare.  
6.3 Simulation software and price coupling algorithm 
Market impacts are measured with Simulation Facility –market tool that represents his-
torical market data such as bid and ask prices, commercial transmission capacities and 
clearing constrains. It utilises real day-ahead Euphemia market algorithm to calculate 
European market coupling area prices and volumes for given time period. Trading algo-
rithm calculates the market settlement where the historical market data should produce 
the same outcome even if calculation is made afterwards.  
Simulation Facility provides historical market information in order to estimate market 
outcomes and impacts for the whole European electricity market area. Estimating rea-
sonable measures between redispatching and capacity reduction requires changing mar-
ket conditions and noticing recurring market impacts. This is done by changing com-
mercial transmission capacity in the RAC-cut transmission with reasonable values that 
could be utilised in practice. Capacity reduction impacts can be evaluated simultaneous-
ly in interconnected countries in addition to Finnish bidding zone impacts. Still, market 
impacts are primary estimated to European bidding zones especially for Nordic coun-
tries, Baltic States, Poland and Germany. However, internal bidding zone capacities 
changes are unavailable in Simulation Facility and only cross-zonal border capacities 
are able to change.  
For TSOs, accessing to Simulation Facility historical market data is preserved in order 
to avoid misuse of individual offers and locations within bidding zones. Therefore, spe-
cific information is concealed such as merit order lists while Euphemia algorithm calcu-
lates the outcome. Simulation Facility offers a possibility to change market conditions 
such as commercial transmission capacity and losses before running Euphemia algo-
rithm. Changes reflects to the European electricity market prices and similarly to inter-
connected transmission flows.  
Welfare maximisation problem is a primary issue when calculating the market outcome. 
First algorithm calculates different set of orders that maximises welfare without consid-
ering transmission network restrictions e.g. ramping limits, losses or tariffs. Restrictions 
are made after branching different solutions with the purpose of determining market 
clearing prices for each bidding zones. Those are determined similarly to fulfil condi-
tions for accepting different set of orders. This could change welfare depending on dif-
ferent sets of orders such as block orders. Every settlement are revalidated in case of 
such as unrealised volumes. (Nord Pool 2016) 
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After calculating the market outcome for given time period, Simulation Facility offers 
results such as prices, cross-zonal flows and producer and consumer surpluses for every 
bidding zones. Iteration process maximises a sum of producer and consumer surpluses 
and congestion incomes creating calculated total welfare. However, simulation results 
doesn´t show congestion incomes although calculation process takes these into account. 
Therefore, congestion incomes are calculated afterwards based on calculation results.  
6.4 Selecting suitable week periods for simulations 
Week periods are selected for further study based on the day-ahead market data gath-
ered from public sources by Nord Pool market data and Fingrid´s Open Data. The day-
ahead market is the primary market trading electricity representing highest liquidity 
compared to other electricity markets where transmission capacity changes will be simi-
larly reflected into the day-ahead market prices. Nord Pool market data represents cross-
zonal transmissions and bidding zone prices and Fingrid´s Open Data represents P1-cut 
transmission.  
Input data is utilised in order to find week periods where transmission capacity has the 
highest impact to the market and further select these weeks to the simulation. The data 
is gathered from Nord Pool and Fingrid Open Data instead of Simulation Facility since 
main values should represent historical market outcomes. The data is gathered based on 
P1- and RAC-cut transmission from years 2016 and 2017 to provide the most up-to-date 
market data as represented in table 1. Each data set is a seven day period in order to 
evaluate different years and seasons accordingly. Both Nord Pool and Fingrid Open Da-
ta does not represent individual offers as described in chapter 6.3. 
Table 1. Data sources for selecting suitable week periods to the simulation based 
on Fingrid (2018c) and Nord Pool (2018a). 
Data sources, years 2016–2017 FI 
Day-ahead prices Nord Pool 
Realised redispatching measures Fingrid´s unpublished data  
Transmission flow (commercial)   
FI-SE1 Nord Pool / Fingrid Open data 
P1-cut Fingrid Open data 
Transmission capacity   
FI-SE1 Nord Pool / Fingrid Open data 
P1-cut Fingrid Open data 
 
Data is utilised with the purpose of finding situations when transmission capacity reduc-
tions have had impact on transmission flow in P1-cut. These situations represents uncer-
tainty during a decision between redispatching and transmission capacity reduction. 
Therefore, main interests are historical congestion incomes, commercial transmission 
capacities and P1-cut transmission flows. Additionally, the day-ahead price data is uti-
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lised to identify price spread between FI-SE1 bidding zones showing limited transmis-
sion capacity. 
Selected data should indicate two main issues in the transmission network. Firstly, the 
P1-cut transmission flow should be as high as possible in order to find real-world-cases 
utilising congestion management methods to relief P1-cut transmission to south. At the 
same time, price difference between FI-SE1 bidding zones should be noticeable illus-
trating congestion in FI-SE1 cross-border. These two factors show limited adequacy in 
transmission capacity in order to study further socio-economic welfare changes and re-
dispatching costs. 
Based on these factors, several data sets represented suitable week periods in years 2016 
and 2017. Between those data sets, 13 weeks were selected from each year further into 
simulation as represented in appendix A including one fourth weeks of a year. Sched-
uled outages that limit transmission capacity in FI-SE1 cross-border were avoided. Se-
lected week periods are compared in simulations with corresponding seasons firstly 
such as winters between different years to notice market impact changes.  
6.5 Verifying reliability of the simulation tool output  
First, Euphemia trading algorithm output data is verified whether algorithm produces 
similar market prices compared to real market prices confirming that Euphemia repre-
sents sufficiently reliable simulation results. All data sets were examined and the data 
set of August 2017 is shown in figure 9 representing difference between real market 
price and simulated market price. Given transmission capacities were identical in order 
to produce comparable results between real and simulated market price and to show al-
gorithm´s functionality. 
 
Figure 9. A week data compering real market price to market price produced by 
Euphemia on 7–13th August 2017 in FI bidding zone. 
Figure 9 shows the correlation between real market price and simulated market price. 
Most of the time simulated market price correlates to real market price with little incon-
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sistency when market conditions are identical and price coupling algorithm is the same. 
Price between Wednesday and Thursday verify possible price spread between real mar-
ket price and simulated market price in high volatility situations and particularly in local 
maximum prices. Similar results were gathered from other data sets and were compared 
with SE1 market price. It seems that algorithm´s heuristic approach produces solutions 
that are not necessarily consistent due to combination of order activation such as block 
orders (Nord Pool 2016). Data sets suggest little inconsistency within few hours in a 
week period with similar differences occurring in SE1 bidding zone. The correlation be-
tween real and simulated market price is over 0,99 in data sets and represent sufficient 
reliability of algorithm´s functionality and reliably market outcomes.  
After this, selected week periods are set to the simulation tool to test further reliability 
of algorithm functionality. For every seven day periods on each data set, RAC-cut 
commercial transmission capacity is reduced on every hundred megawatt to the -600 
MW from the initial capacity which is typically 1400–1500 MW. More specific capaci-
ty reduction values such as values between 0-100 MW are not concluded since values 
could be aggregated accordingly from data points between 0-600 MW on every hundred 
megawatt. The highest capacity reduction value of -600 MW is based on practical 
transmission capacity reduction measures. In practice, even the -200 MW reduction on 
the RAC-cut transmission capacity is an excessive measure in a normal transmission 
network situation (Fingrid 2018a). 
Now Euphemia -algorithm is tested whether the Finnish market price responds to 
transmission capacity changes properly. All data sets represent import situations to 
Finnish bidding zone and transmission capacity reductions between FI-SE1 bidding 
zones should therefore increase the market price. Export situations typically occurs at 
night and is under three percentage of the normal exchange between FI-SE1 bidding 
zones as described in chapter 6.2. Figure 10 represents data set of January 2017 and cor-
responding transmission capacity changes affecting to the simulated market price. Iden-
tical initial transmission capacities were applied in order to produce comparable prices 
and showing algorithm´s functionality between actual market outcome and simulated 
market outcome. 
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Figure 10. Market price after the RAC-cut transmission capacity reduction from ini-
tial capacity on 16–22th January 2017 in FI bidding zone. 
As estimated, represented capacity reduction increases the Finnish market price and 
lowers import from SE1 bidding zone. Each transmission capacity reductions step 
shows higher market price increase indicating correctly functioning simulation envi-
ronment. During nights, capacity changes are not influenced since reduced transmission 
capacities are adequate without restricting the transmission flow between FI-SE1 bid-
ding zones.  
Market price volatility represent different conditions between working days and week-
end and between day and night affected by transmission capacity reductions. Market 
impacts generally occur during working week and especially during 07–20 hours. Simi-
larly, transmission flow in RAC-cut and P1-cut is the most highest during those hours. 
Essentially, reduced capacity measures should not lower market price below simulated 
market price during initial RAC-cut capacity whether algorithm functions correctly. 
However, optimised solution by algorithm appears to have inconsistency such as at 
Monday 16.1 hours 16–17 on figure 10. During those hours, market price after reduced 
capacity of 300–600 MW reveals to be lower than simulated market price suggesting 
optimisation uncertainty in market price settlement. Also during Monday´s peak price, 
the price did not increase while it decreased actual flow between FI-SE1 bidding zones. 
This may occur due to high price located in Swedish bidding zones. Similar results are 
shown at Wednesday 18.1 hours 8–9 when price after 400 MW capacity reduction 
shows higher market price than 500–600 MW capacity reduction. During these hours, 
Fenno-Skan and Estlink transmissions were reasonable without proving any significant 
changes. Dissimilarities are found from other week periods representing issue in larger 
perspective during working week.  
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It seems that inconsistency occurs during working week and individual issues represent 
0,8 percent of hours of five day period. Therefore, its significance for study results is 
limited if measured data sets are sufficiently long periods and inconsistencies are lim-
ited to individual occasions in working week. Instead, measuring weekend doesn´t nec-
essarily produce comparable study results if data set quantities are limited to few. Simi-
larly, calculation results are volatile due to high volatility of RAC-cut and P1-cut trans-
mission flow between different days of a week. 
6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Capacity reduction impacts on European socio-
economic welfare 
Selected week periods are represented in chapter 6.4 and those periods are set to Simu-
lation Facility market tool. A sample week of 16–22th January 2017 is represented in 
figure 11 to notice welfare changes in European market coupling area. Similarities are 
noticeable compared to price changes in figure 10 where the most market impacts occur 
during working week and daytime between hours 07–20. The RAC-cut transmission ca-
pacity was originally 1520–1530 MW. 
 
Figure 11. A week welfare change on RAC-cut capacity reduction measures in Euro-
pean market coupling area. 
Fundamentally, every capacity reduction step generally represent decreasing welfare 
during high transmission and high net import during a day 16.1 shows the highest im-
pacts to the market after reduced RAC-cut transmission. Changing net import in Finnish 
bidding zone seems to indicate negative correlation between welfare change and market 
price. If excessive import is restricted, it leads to increasing areal price and decreasing 
welfare. These changes are not affecting to night-time prices or welfare when the trans-
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mission capacity is adequate without restricting the transmission. Similar events occur 
at the weekend with limited noticeable welfare impacts.  
Some of these hours represent positive welfare change even if capacity reductions are 
realised. In particular hours, such as during the day 16.1 evening, market price seems to 
be same without depending on reduction measures. This is due to fact that high conges-
tion incomes in SE3 increase hourly total welfare excessively leading to positive total 
welfare in European market coupling area created by increasing price spread between 
FI-SE1 bidding zones.  
The price spread between different bidding zones clarifies that increasing price spread 
leads to increasing or decreasing welfare depending on absolute price change. Decreas-
ing price leads to higher total welfare for bidding zone and increasing price leads to 
lower total welfare for bidding zone if absolute consumer surplus is higher than produc-
er surplus. Lower bidding zone price compared to initial situation represents either low-
er demand or higher transmission from adjacent Swedish bidding zones. Higher price 
e.g. in Finnish bidding zone represents either higher demand or lower import from adja-
cent bidding zone 
Then, simulated capacity reduction impacts are measured in figure 11 for every bidding 
zone in Nordic countries, Baltic States, Poland and Germany to show individual chang-
es between bidding zones. As figure shows, capacity reduction impacts are limited into 
few bidding zones and shows relatively high dependency of the RAC-cut transmission. 
Limited impacts are noticed in Poland (PL), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK 1–2) and 
Norwegian bidding zones (NO 1–4) with the exception of NO1 bidding zone. Welfare 
impacts on those bidding zones are generally absent compared to overall bidding zone 
welfare. 
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Figure 12. Bidding zone socio-economic welfare week change after RAC-cut capacity 
reduction of 0–600 MW on 16–22th January 2017. 
Socio-economic welfare impacts are noticed in FI, SE1, SE3, SE4, Estonian (EE), Lith-
uanian (LT) and Latvian (LV) bidding zones indicating that Finnish adjacent bidding 
zones have higher impacts of reduced capacity compared to other bidding zones. Partic-
ularly, other data sets as represented in Appendix B show similar welfare changes in FI, 
SE1 and SE3 bidding zones and expresses high dependency of the RAC-cut transmis-
sion. Occasionally, SE2 bidding zone welfare impacts are high but not evident in every 
occasions. Welfare changes are generally negative whereas positive changes occur in 
SE3 and EE bidding zones. High positive welfare change in SE3 depends on excessive 
transmission from adjacent bidding zones with limited transmission capacity demon-
strating high congestion incomes to SE3 bidding zone and high welfare change.  
During a P1-cut congestion and RAC-cut capacity reduction, Fenno-Skan cross-border 
import increases from Swedish bidding zone. It relieves P1-cut transmission when elec-
tricity supply in Southern Finland is covered more by Fenno-Skan transmission. For ex-
ample, 500 MW RAC-cut capacity reduction increases Fenno-Skan transmission aver-
agely by 165 MW during day 16.1 and the actual capacity reduction impact is lower 
than initial capacity reduction measure. The similar occurrence in Estlink connection is 
depending on whether import or export situation occurs. While the export from Finnish 
bidding zone is more common, transmission flow increases averagely by 75 MW if 500 
MW RAC-cut capacity reduction is realised. Instead, transmission shows 31 MW de-
crease during import situation from Estonia. This could be due to higher price in Latvia 
and Lithuania and electricity should be sold to corresponding bidding zones rather than 
to the Finnish bidding zone. 
Occurring RAC-cut capacity reduction influences positively to Estonian bidding zone 
due to Estonian production capacity and Lithuanian and Latvian reliance to Estonian 
bidding zone changes. Estonia is self-reliant of its electricity and electricity is common-
ly exported to Lithuania and Latvia (Litgrid 2018). This is also noticeable with Finnish 
export (Elering 2018) and its impact on increasing producers´ welfare in Estonia. Lithu-
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ania and Latvia are not as self-reliant of electricity as Estonia and therefore, dependency 
of electricity export is evident explaining higher surplus in Estonia. Situation represents 
decreasing welfare in Lithuanian and Latvian welfares if transmission flow though Fin-
land and Estonia is limited. 
Then, welfare changes are measured for the 13 most congested weeks on each year in 
2016–2017 in figure 13. Welfare changes caused by reduction measure are almost con-
stant with a small increase into costs after higher reduction measures as similarly repre-
sented in figure 12 for year 2017. Comparable range of capacity reduction costs are rep-
resented in figure 6, however welfare impacts seems to have low estimated impacts per 
MWh even if selecting the most 13 congested weeks. 
 
Figure 13. European market coupling area average capacity reduction cost on con-
gested hours in the 13 most congested weeks in 2017. 
On average, every 100 MW reduction step decreases European socio-economic welfare 
approximately 15–45 €/MWh as shown in figure 13 if only congested hours of a week 
are included. This is also the average hourly capacity reduction cost in a week if the 
RAC-cut transmission capacity is reduced. Higher capacity reduction measure increases 
average costs per MWh slightly although it is not consistent in particular weeks. Vola-
tile costs are highly depending on an hour of the day and represents higher costs during 
the daytime and particularly in the morning and the evening. During year 2016, capacity 
reduction costs are almost identical changing 15–45 €/MWh compared to year 2017 
however, two weeks in 8.–14.1.2016 and 15.–21.1.2016 showed average costs above 80 
€/MWh. Those two weeks are due to very low temperatures in Finnish bidding zone 
with already congested RAC-cut transmission.  
Volatile costs are also due to different seasons of years and especially late summer and 
early autumn weeks are represented in the 13 most congested weeks. Generally, those 
seasons in 1.7–30.9 shows the most welfare impacts subject to low electricity consump-
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tion and combined heat and power production. As a result, production proportion is 
generated more with hydropower indicating higher transmission in RAC-cut. This in-
creases the average P1-cut transmission to 1270 MW in summer 2017. P1- and RAC-
cut similarities are found as well during springtime when the least market impacts are 
measured as shown in figure 7. 
Relatively constant capacity reduction costs are as a result of market outcome with his-
torical data and made assumptions. Due to historical supply and demand orders, market 
participants´ bidding behaviour is static and willingness to offer does not change even 
after excessive changes in the market. In reality, producers might set higher offers after 
excessive capacity reductions and results higher bidding zone price and relatively higher 
welfare changes. Therefore, capacity reduction may indicate euros per MWh costs in-
crease in reality which cannot be verified in simulated environment. This uncertainty is 
noticed to improved congestion management method. 
6.6.2 Estimating costs and reasonable range for redispatching 
Due to rare occurrence of redispatching for internal congestion management, redis-
patching costs are estimated based on up- and down-regulation balancing market prices 
due to low volume of historical redispatching costs. Balancing market price represents 
the most up-to-date data available of current market price estimation for redispatching. 
Historical redispatching costs are selected based on real situations during transmission 
congestions. Therefore, internal bidding zone and Fenno-Skan transmission interrup-
tions and congestions are selected and compared with corresponding up- and down reg-
ulation bids as illustrated in figure 14. Up-regulation bids are represented with exponen-
tial regression and down-regulation bids with linear regression. 
 
Figure 14. Ordered up- and down-regulation bids from balancing market in 2017. 
(Adapted from Fingrid 2018c) 
Distinctive difference between up- and down-regulation offers are volatility and highly 
increasing price during increasing volumes in up-regulation bids, and setting uncertain-
ties to estimate ordered up-regulation bids. Ordered up-regulating bids generally follow 
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historical redispatching prices between 0–300 MW reasonably well though, over 300 
MW requirement increases price uncertainty and estimated up-regulation prices due to 
unrealised up-regulating bids over 300 MW. Still, most of up-regulation bids are situat-
ed in a range of 20–100 €/MWh. However, ordered down-regulation bids follow histor-
ical redispatching costs with standard deviation of 26±6 €/MWh regardless of redis-
patching volume in 2017 and similarly 22±7 €/MWh in 2016 concluding relatively low 
price compared to the day-ahead price. Down-regulated bids follow historical redis-
patching values reasonably well in all reduction measures. Still, figure 14 confirms low 
predictability of regression curves due to low R-squared values. Additionally, zero val-
ues in down-regulation bids has a limited impact to the estimations since its impacts is 
0,2 % of all down-regulation bids during that year. 
Ordered up- and down-regulation were estimated in terms of whether values have a re-
lation with the day-ahead and balancing market prices a day before the operating hour 
showing how well market prices could be estimated in advance. If up-regulation bids 
are compared to the day-ahead price, it implies moderately low relation due to correla-
tion coefficient of 0,30 in 2017 and 0,24 in 2016. Higher relation were found from 
down-regulation bids indicating correlation coefficient of 0,43 in 2017 and 0,47 in 2016 
representing moderately positive dependency to the day-ahead price. Similar character-
istics occurs with real historical up- and down-regulation redispatching prices with low 
evident correlation to the day-ahead price. 
Then, redispatching unpredictability is measured by estimating balancing market prices 
comparing balancing market price for up- and down-regulation instead of the day-ahead 
market price one and two days before delivering hour. Correlation coefficients are con-
cluded in table 2 and representing no or moderate correlation to previous dates. This is 
similar correlation compared to the day-ahead market price. 
Table 2. Balancing market correlation coefficient comparing operation hour price 
and 1–2 days before balancing market price. 
D vs. D-1 correlation Up-regulation bid 0.22 
 
Down-regulation bid 0.45 
D vs. D-2 correlation Up-regulation bid 0.12 
 
Down-regulation bid 0.29 
 
Down-regulation bid correlation coefficient shows slightly higher correlation to prices 
of earlier days due to reluctance to increase bid prices compared to up-regulation bid 
prices. Therefore, moderately low correlation in down-regulation bids are slightly better 
predicted compared to up-regulation bids if balancing market prices are estimated a day 
before. Estimations before D-2 shows low predictability for up- and down-regulation 
estimation and does not provide reliable estimation. The issue confirms unpredictability 
of balancing market price with given volume especially in ordered up-regulation bids. 
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While the predictability is low with up- and down-regulation bids, average values fol-
lows reasonably well historical redispatching costs. This especially means redispatching 
measures below 200 MW volume follows balancing market price level. Therefore, av-
erage values are foundation for estimated down-regulation bids and volatility is noticed 
later in this chapter whether price changes impact on decision between different conges-
tion management methods.  
Then, those up- and down-regulation values from 2016–2017 were separated quarterly 
and estimated corresponding redispatching costs are created by calculating real week 
average balancing market price multiplied with estimated exponential function for up- 
and down-regulation. Exponential function illustrates highly increasing price when vol-
ume increases. Estimation coefficients are concluded in appendix C and following con-
gestion management costs for 16–22th January 2017 are illustrated in figure 15. Only 
congested hours are included to produce comparable results with similar hours of capac-
ity reduction costs.  
 
Figure 15. Comparing congestion management costs with deviation on 16–22th Jan-
uary 2017 during congested hours. 
Congestion management shows increasing redispatching costs per MWh depending es-
sentially on up-regulation balancing market price. Balancing market price increases ex-
ponentially and higher measures shows higher costs compared to capacity reduction 
costs. Capacity reduction measures show elasticity when increasing congestion in P1-
cut represents no response into congestion management costs showing around 28 
€/MWh for following week period. It is relatively inexpensive per MWh on higher con-
gestions compared to redispatching or even average day-ahead market price of 34,44 
€/MWh during the period (Nord Pool 2018a). Essentially, intersection of two functions 
shows that both methods are justified to relieve P1-cut congestion. In this case, estimat-
ed average up-regulating price during 200 MW required actions is 58,78 €/MWh and 
down-regulation price is 28,73 €/MWh. These are calculated from historical week aver-
age up- and down-regulation prices from Fingrid Open Data platform (Fingrid 2018c) 
multiplied with estimated balancing market regulating price coefficients in Appendix C. 
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High intersection point of 180 MW does not generally occur in other congested weeks 
in 2017 and 2016. Compering this data set to the higher congested situation such as the 
data set 7–13th August 2017 shows that the data set represents intersection between re-
dispatching and capacity reduction to 25 €/MWh and 30 MWh/h. These are calculated 
similarly compared to the figure 15 values based on Fingrid Open Data historical bal-
ancing market regulating prices and Appendix C coefficients for redispatching and fol-
lowing week represented in figure 13 for capacity reduction values. This week illus-
trates congested situation that might justify capacity reduction even during below 100 
MW required measures than current transmission congestion management method sug-
gest. This is analysed further whether congestions effect on intersection between redis-
patching and capacity reduction.   
Therefore, all intersections between redispatching and capacity reduction from the most 
13 congested weeks in 2017 and 2016 are illustrated to figure 16. One week from 2016 
and five weeks from 2017 were not represented due to unrealised intersections and cou-
ple values within 0–70 MW volumes are overlapping. Fundamentally, linear representa-
tion shows identical costs between redispatching and capacity reduction. If e.g. redis-
patching costs a day before the delivery hour shows higher costs compared to the linear 
representations, then capacity reduction is suggested. Similarly, if redispatching costs a 
day before the delivery hour shows lower costs compared to the linear representation, 
then redispatching is suggested. Deviations are shown on the following table 3. 
 
Figure 16. Data points representing intersections between redispatching and capaci-
ty reduction curves in the most congested weeks only including congestion hours 
in 2016 and 2017. 
Intersection between redispatching and capacity reductions shows that even higher over-
loads indicate higher acceptability of congestion management costs and redispatching 
feasibility in 2016. Year 2016 represented more highly congested weeks compared to 
year 2017 especially due to cold temperatures during winter in 2016. While the devia-
tion between data points is high, increment into costs clarifies presupposition: higher the 
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need for resources, higher justification is for higher priced redispathing. It seems that 
minimum congestion management costs are at around 20 €/MWh within 0–50 MWh/h 
overloads either with redispatching or capacity reduction.  
During a range of 50–100 MW as represented in table 3, average redispatching remains 
within average capacity reduction costs in 2016. Instead, higher redispatching volatility 
in 2017 year causes that the justification for both actions is under 50 MW. However, it 
is suggested that redispatching is realised within 50–100 MW measures as a result of 
high volatility in redispatching costs and an opportunity to cancel congestion manage-
ment before delivering hour. This verifies justification of both actions within 50–100 
MW volumes since capacity reduction costs show similar magnitude and accurate deci-
sion is not easily measured.  Still, requirements approximately above 100 MW does not 
show low redispatching costs and the decision should be based on comparing different 
congestion management costs further a day before the delivery hour.  
Table 3. Average congestion management costs with standard deviation on the most 
13 congested weeks in each year of 2016–2017. 
 2017  2016  
MW Redispatch 
€/MWh 
Capacity reduction 
€/MWh 
Redispatch 
€/MWh 
Capacity reduction 
€/MWh 
50 30±16  27±8 34±15 43±24 
75 34±17 27±8 38±17 43±24 
100 39±19 27±8 44±20 43±25 
150 52±25 27±9 63±26 39±23 
200 71±33 26±11 82±33 36±21 
 
Additionally, linear representation in figure 16 generally illustrates the decision between 
congestion management methods. After noticing both redispatching costs in a range of 
100–200 MW, redispatching cost variation becomes more unpredictable due to higher 
variation of available redispatching resources without similar result noticed in capacity 
reduction costs. Therefore, redispatching is justified if its costs are similar or lower than 
average capacity reduction costs including the deviation. Then, capacity reduction is 
justified if redispatching costs are higher than average capacity reduction costs includ-
ing the deviation. This general statement is justified since accurate measures between 
100–200 MW are not possible due to uncertainties of available redispatching resources 
and prices a day before the delivery hour. 
A notable observation is that extensive congestions above 150–200 MW indicate that 
redispatching becomes more expensive and capacity reduction measure is socio-
economically justified. Although, bilateral trades are generally more inexpensive than 
balancing market bids and may lead realising bilateral redispatch if possible. Therefore, 
redispatching may be preferred above 200 MW if resources are reliably available and 
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priced reasonably indicating a range of 20–50 €/MWh. This is generally the price range 
for capacity reduction costs during congestion.  
However, redispatching and capacity reducition methods could be realised simultane-
ously. This is suggested if it lowers the total socio-economic costs. In this case, 200 
MW overload could be realise by redispatching 100 MW and reducing RAC-cut capaci-
ty by 100 MW. The actual proportion between redispatching and capacity reduction 
volumes should be based on essentially measuring costs of the redispatching on differ-
ent volumes. Then the cheapest offers are realised and remaining is reduced by trans-
mission reduction. 
Furthermore above 200 MW requirements, figure 16 does not provide data points above 
200 MW and the decision between congestion management actions is not fully reliable. 
Therefore, available resources are analysed to clarify maximum reliable volume for re-
dispatching. Resources are estimated based on up- and down-regulation offers after or-
dered regulating power in 2016–2017. These residual values are gathered in figure 17 
expressing possible availability for redispatching.  Still, all available bids are not possi-
ble to realise when redispatching depends on production location and duration curve is 
respectively lower. Duration curve shows reliability where every 0,03 step represents 11 
days of a year. Due to nature of redispatching, both up- and down-regulation bids 
should be available reliably. 
 
Figure 17. Balancing market resources after ordered up- and down-regulation power 
in years 2016–2017. (Fingrid 2018c) 
Up- and down-regulation bids are clearly separated in terms of power and utilisation 
rate illustrating reliability challenge for redispatching resources in a few weeks of a 
year. Up-regulation bids have more deviation between years and comparing years 2016–
2017 indicates that average up-regulation for redispatching with 0,97 reliability is 420 
MW. The reliability issue is evident in down-regulation which clarifies lower reliability 
if required actions are similar than up-regulation of 420 MW. In this case, reliability is 
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0,50 and over 0,90 reliability is guaranteed below 200 MW measures. Availability for 
up-regulation bids are generally reliable however, reliability for down-regulation is not 
guaranteed generally over 100 MW if required reliability is 0,97. In practice, only a part 
of corresponding volumes are accepted to redispatching due to required production or 
consumption locations and sufficient reliability is generally compromised during a few 
weeks within a year. 
Seasonal changes within a year are impacting on redispatching reliability and yearly av-
erage is not necessarily representing the issue reliably. Quarter measurements in 2016–
2017 elevates differences between summers and winters which generally states 200 
MW difference between seasons. Fundamentally, winters issue more generation power 
due to higher need of electricity and enables higher volumes during winters. While the 
most of congestions occurs during summers, this generally worsen possible redispatch-
ing realisations compared to figure 17 values. Alternatively, redispatching could be re-
placed in south by countertrading via DC-links if redispatching is unavailable. 
Now, all following results from chapters 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 are concluded into figure 18 
showing simplified decision between redispatching and capacity reduction measures in 
congested market situations. Capacity reduction costs in a range of 20–60 €/MWh 
shows the most challenges for decision between different actions. Challenges are espe-
cially within 100–200 MW range where increasing redispatching costs are still more 
justified than transmission capacity reduction and therefore, diagonal line represents the 
decision generally. Diagonal line is estimated based on figure 13, table 3, average linear 
representation of 2016–2017 in figure 16, 13 the most congested week data in 2016–
2017 for redispatching and capacity reduction costs and due to assumptions to choose 
redispatching if capacity reduction shows similar costs. 
 
Figure 18. Simplified decision between congestion management methods during con-
gested P1-cut. 
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Decision during 0–100 MW overloads did not indicate explicit difference between re-
dispatching or capacity reduction costs and therefore, redispatching is preferred between 
0–100 MW overloads as stated in assumptions. Above 200 MW volumes, redispatching 
resources are not necessarily available and redispatching is not recommended in higher 
volumes as partially due to highly increasing redispatching costs. Redispatching could 
be realised above 200 MW overloads if reasonable priced resources are available. This 
essentially means redispatching cost range of 30–60 €/MWh which is similar to capaci-
ty reduction costs. 
Accurate decision in intersections at 30 €/MWh and 100 MW and similarly at 60 
€/MWh and 200 MW are hard to validate due to uncertainty of estimated redispatching 
and capacity reduction costs. As stated in table 3, redispatching cost uncertainty in-
creases in higher measures and e.g. 150 MW volume has a deviation of 25 €/MWh. 
However, diagonal line represents average justification between both methods which 
should be noticed along with deviation of redispatching costs. Transmission capacity 
reduction is generally justified in higher volumes due to increasing redispatching costs 
and uncertainty of available redispatching resources.  
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7. DISCUSSION 
By definition, determining decision between congestion management methods is an op-
timisation issue where redispatching and capacity reduction cost uncertainty causes ina-
bility to conclude accurate methods. Decision is essentially depending how much cross-
zonal transmission capacity restricts the actual flow between bidding zones. If all given 
transmission capacity for allocation is utilised, it indicates most impacts to adjacent bid-
ding zones as a result of increasing price spread. Therefore, adequacy of transmission 
capacity is a foundation for minimal market impacts. 
At first, most capacity reduction impacts were expected into adjacent bidding zones of 
FI-SE1 cross-border and Baltic States. It was unexpected that impacts are occurring not 
only in FI and SE1 bidding zones, but essentially in SE3 bidding zone which generally 
issues higher market impacts compared to SE1 bidding zone. It was presumed that SE3 
market impacts could be high but actual results confirmed a clear correlation to the 
RAC-cut capacity reduction. This occurs subject to large internal market area, high 
transmission between FI-SE3 bidding zones and other SE3 cross-zonal interconnections 
and therefore, high congestion incomes advances SE3 positive socio-economic welfare. 
Welfare impacts to Baltic States were expected to be lower compared to Finnish bidding 
zone due to smaller market area and results clarified this presumption. Impacts general-
ly occurred in Estonian and Lithuanian bidding zones as a result of Estonian self-
reliance of electricity and Lithuanian reliance of Estonian electricity.  
Capacity reduction clarifies connection to the RAC-cut transmission and further reflect-
ing to the P1-cut transmission during congested hours. Capacity reduction did not show 
market impacts if transmission flow in FI-SE1 were not restricted. It was presumed that 
capacity reduction shows exponential cost increment on every reduction step due to 
higher marginal costs of Finnish electricity market resources compared Swedish and 
Norwegian resources marginal cost. Surprisingly, capacity reduction costs implied rela-
tively linear decrease into costs representing almost constant costs per MWh on every 
reduction measure. One explanation is that Finnish supply merit order list is rather line-
ar and the transmission capacity change issues linear price change and consequently, 
linear socio-economic welfare change. Other explanation is that market participants' 
bidding behaviour is static due to the use of historical offers in simulations and such as 
producers' ability to offer higher bids during foreseen congestion in reality could in-
crease bidding zone price indicating higher negative welfare change. Additionally, stud-
ied years 2016–2017 may not represent results truthfully in future if markets witness 
major changes in production and consumption or in the transmission network. 
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Higher predictability of capacity reduction costs compared to redispatching costs were 
expected due to lower socio-economic welfare change deviation between weeks. Still, 
estimated redispatching costs based on balancing market prices did not remove uncer-
tainty from realised prices and volumes. Essentially, redispatching unpredictability is 
due to available resources and how rapidly congestions occur. Approaching closer to 
operational hour will increases production costs due to faster need of electricity which is 
not necessarily foreseen a day before the delivery day. However, higher requirements of 
redispatching will generally increase deviation of corresponding costs and decreases 
predictability above 300 MW requirement due to absence of balancing market offers. 
This increased study result uncertainties during higher congestions.  
Surprisingly, higher volumes indicated resources unavailability especially in down-
regulating bids and shows 0,97 utilisation rate below 100 MW volumes. However, real-
ising all available balancing market offers are not possible due to production location 
and its impropriety for redispatching explaining even lower reliability above 100 MW 
requirement. It clarifies that redispatching may not be socio-economically appropriate 
or reliably available for extended overload situations and economically may lead higher 
costs if resources are unavailable. Still, redispatching measures are desirable as long as 
congestions are foreseen due to generally lower costs.  
Essentially, results between real and simulated market prices indicate occasionally dis-
similarities during local maximum prices. Calculation iterations may take several itera-
tion without finding optimal solution for the same situation in simulation environment. 
Euphemia –algorithm utilises some heuristics approaches that doesn´t necessarily guar-
antee optimal or identical solution always. Therefore, calculation results might change 
in few single hours depending on different iteration progress. Its impacts on study re-
sults are limited since small changes into prices in high volatility environment creates 
low impacts on average weekly socio-economic values. The issue could compromise re-
sults if time frames are defined only to couple days. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis discusses internal bidding zone congestion management in capacity calcula-
tion phase and reflects concerns of undue discrimination in order to improve efficiency 
and handling of internal congestions in capacity calculation. Concern of socio-economic 
welfare changes in the European day-ahead market are encountered with measuring al-
ternative method for relieving congestion in the P1-cut transmission. This essentially is 
depending on a decision between estimated redispatching or capacity reduction costs 
where the least impact to the market will indicate the most efficient and justified method 
for relieving congestions.  
Congestion management methods are estimated based on market analysis from years 
2016–2017 indicating European-wide market impacts during the RAC-cut transmission 
capacity reduction. Thesis improves current method by utilising simulation tool with 
European scope to determine market outcomes and socio-economic welfare changes re-
lieving congested P1- and RAC-cut transmission. Simulation represents more accurate 
method compared to earlier method to estimate capacity reduction impacts regarding to 
the socio-economic welfare change. Redispatching costs were estimated based on bal-
ancing market prices due to low quantity of historical measures. 
The actual range of simulated capacity reduction costs in the RAC-cut transmission dur-
ing congestions are averagely within 15–45 €/MWh and especially within 20–30 
€/MWh regardless of volume and represents lower costs compared to the average day-
ahead market price. Capacity reduction does not indicate directly higher price in Finnish 
bidding zone or higher price spread between FI-SE1 bidding zones if transmission flow 
is adequate. If capacity is restricting the transmission flow, the majority of market im-
pacts occur in Finnish bidding zone, but respectively capacity changes influence Swe-
dish and Baltic State bidding zones. Simulations indicated that impacts are depending 
on seasons and the P1-cut congestion issues are subject to high RAC-cut imports and a 
lack of reasonable priced production resources in Southern Finland.   
Estimated redispatching costs indicated increasingly higher costs and uncertainty de-
pending on required volumes. Within 0–100 MW required volumes, redispatching costs 
showed similar or slightly lower costs compared to capacity reduction costs but did not 
show distinctive difference between one another. During higher volumes, redispatching 
costs become increasingly expensive supporting capacity reduction measures if redis-
patching costs exceed above 60 €/MWh. Similarly, unpredictability increases on re-
quired redispatching volume and such as 100 MW requirement shows averagely 
±20€/MWh volatility. Higher volumes and especially volumes above 200 MW showed 
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limitations on down-regulating power resources availability and clarifying uncertainty 
and limitations of redispatching on higher volumes. Despite of the fact that estimated 
redispatching costs are highly unpredictable, reasonable results are concluded especially 
around 100 MW required volumes.  
Based on higher knowledge of congestion management method applied in capacity cal-
culation enables reflecting earlier method in a new perspective. Earlier method realised 
undue discrimination rules generally well however, individual realised prices and vol-
umes are occasionally higher than improved method would suggest. Before, capacity 
reduction costs in FI-SE1 border were estimated based on assumptions and general cal-
culation without utilising simulation tools. In individual cases, earlier estimation under-
valued capacity reduction impacts. This however, is due to calculating only Finnish 
cross-zonal border impacts without noticing broader impacts to the European electricity 
market.  
Simulated market outcomes brought higher accuracy to estimate improved congestion 
management representing more detailed market impacts compared to earlier method. 
Redispatching estimation uncertainty lowers accuracy of improved method and reflects 
the difficulty to choose between congestion management methods. While the uncertain-
ties are evident, improved method achieved its objectives and fulfilled avoiding undue 
discrimination rules on congestion management. Improved methods function also with 
upcoming capacity calculation e.g. CNTC and flow-based methods.  
However, further review of other cross-zonal borders are suggested for congestion man-
agement purposes and especially Estlink capacity reduction could be used instead of the 
RAC-cut capacity reduction. As further work, it could be studied whether in some cases 
it would be more efficient to reduce the export capacity to Estonia instead of the RAC-
cut import capacity in order to relieve the P1-cut congestion. Also, changes to conges-
tion management method should be evaluated after Olkiluoto 3 power plant starts power 
production resulting 300 MW reduction to the RAC-cut transmission capacity. Its im-
pacts on congestion management methods should be then reviewed further. Additional-
ly, results of the method should be re-evaluated after any significant change in electrici-
ty market. 
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APPENDIX A: SIMULATED WEEK PERIODS 
Time     
periods 
Date (7 day period) 
Average price difference and 
deviation in FI 
Average P1-cut transmission 
and deviation 
2017 16.1.2017 - 22.1.2017 34.49 ± 11.68 €/MWh 1008 ± 528 MW 
  6.2.2017 - 12.2.2017 40.48 ± 10.53 €/MWh 749   ± 394 MW 
  20.2.2017 - 26.2.2017 31.46 ± 6.44 €/MWh 702   ± 515 MW 
  3.7.2017 - 9.7.2017 40.19 ± 10.15 €/MWh 1585 ± 247 MW 
  24.7.2017 - 30.7.2017 33.38 ± 10.02 €/MWh 1323 ± 412 MW 
  31.7.2017 - 6.8.2017 29.81 ± 7.95 €/MWh 951   ± 460 MW 
  7.8.2017 - 13.8.2017 34.38 ± 11.47 €/MWh 1084 ± 532 MW 
  4.9.2017 - 10.9.2017 39.00 ± 10.87 €/MWh 1495 ± 485 MW 
  25.9.2017 - 1.10.2017 35.53 ± 7.33 €/MWh 1020 ± 492 MW 
  9.10.2017 - 15.10.2017 35.87 ± 13.95 €/MWh 819   ± 708 MW 
  23.10.2017 - 29.10.2017 33.74 ± 11.41 €/MWh 982   ± 601 MW 
  4.12.2017 - 10.12.2017 32.00 ± 7.12 €/MWh 622   ± 718 MW 
  18.12.2017 - 24.12.2017 32.25 ± 13.15 €/MWh 608   ± 776 MW 
2016 1.1.2016 - 7.1.2016 30.86 ± 17.40 €/MWh 948   ± 313 MW 
  8.1.2016 - 14.1.2016 40.92 ± 21.84 €/MWh 934   ± 349 MW 
  15.1.2016 - 21.1.2016 54.11 ± 40.79 €/MWh 774   ± 284 MW 
  
22.1.2016 - 28.1.2016 32.58 ± 15.68 €/MWh 763   ± 448 MW 
  29.1.2016 - 4.2.2016 26.10 ± 10.51 €/MWh 958   ± 373 MW 
  12.2.2016 - 18.2.2016 26.20 ± 9.33 €/MWh 1088 ± 359 MW 
  18.3.2016 - 24.3.2016 29.21 ± 10.72 €/MWh 1022 ± 409 MW 
  1.4.2016 - 7.4.2016 26.01 ± 8.09 €/MWh 650   ± 500 MW 
  20.5.2016 - 26.5.2016 29.75 ± 10.29 €/MWh 1337 ± 592 MW 
  3.6.2016 - 9.6.2016 32.93 ± 11.92 €/MWh 1140 ± 519 MW 
  2.9.2016 - 8.9.2016 32.61 ± 8.50 €/MWh 1028 ± 476 MW 
  9.9.2016 - 15.9.2016 34.58 ± 10.71 €/MWh 1131 ± 330 MW 
  30.9.2016 - 6.10.2016 34.80 ± 10.23 €/MWh 1433 ± 520 MW 
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE WEEKS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC WEL-
FARE CHANGE DURING REDUCED TRANSMISSION CAPACITY 
OF 0–600 MW 
16–22th January 2017 
 
8–14th February 2016 
 
7–13th August 2017 
 
4–10th July 2016 
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APPENDIX C: ESTIMATED BALANCING MARKET REGULATING 
PRICE COEFFICIENTS 
Up-regulation 
 
Quarter 0MW 100MW 200MW 300MW 400MW 500MW 600MW 
2017 Q1 1 1.271249 1.616074 2.054433 2.611696 3.320117 4.230838 
 
Q2 1 1.506818 2.2705 3.42123 5.15517 7.767901 11.7529 
 
Q3 1 1.552707 2.4109 3.743421 5.812437 9.025013 14.075 
 
Q4 1 1.537258 2.363161 3.632787 5.584528 8.584858 13.25401 
2016 Q1 1 1.682028 2.829217 4.758821 8.004469 13.46374 22.76445 
 
Q2 1 1.616074 2.611696 4.220696 6.820958 11.02318 17.89999 
 
Q3 1 1.537258 2.363161 3.632787 5.584528 8.584858 13.25401 
 
Q4 1 1.29693 1.682028 2.181472 2.829217 3.669297 4.77121 
 
Down-regulation 
 
Quarter 0MW 100MW 200MW 300MW 400MW 500MW 600W 
2017 Q1 1 0.99005 0.980199 0.970446 0.960789 0.951229 0.94167 
 
Q2 1 1.127497 1.271249 1.433329 1.616074 1.822119 2.0569 
 
Q3 1 1.116278 1.246077 1.390968 1.552707 1.733253 1.936922 
 
Q4 1 1.051271 1.105171 1.161834 1.221403 1.284025 1.350534 
2016 Q1 1 0.995012 0.99005 0.985112 0.980199 0.97531 0.970397 
 
Q2 1 1.138828 1.29693 1.476981 1.682028 1.915541 2.18431 
 
Q3 1 0.970446 0.941765 0.913931 0.88692 0.860708 0.83502 
 
Q4 1 0.980199 0.960789 0.941765 0.923116 0.904837 0.886743 
 
